STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. DE 19-064

IN THE MATTER OF: LIBERTY UTILITIES (GRANITE STATE ELECTRIC) CORP. D/B/A LIBERTY UTILITIES

Distribution Service Rate Case

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

Dr. J. Randall Woolridge

December 6, 2019

Liberty Utilities (Granite State Electric) Corp. Docket No. DE 19-064

Direct Testimony of Dr. J. Randall Woolridge

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1	I. <u>Introduction</u>
2	Q. Please state your full name.
3	A. My name is J. Randall Woolridge.
4	Q. By whom are you employed and what is your business address?
5	A. I am a Professor of Finance and the Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Frank P. Smeal
6	Endowed University Fellow in Business Administration at the University Park
7	Campus of Pennsylvania State University. I am also the Director of the Smeal
8	College Trading Room and President of the Nittany Lion Fund, LLC. A summary
9	of my educational background, research, and related business experience is
10	provided in Attachment JRW-1.
11	Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
12	A. I have been asked by the Staff of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission to
13	provide an opinion as to the overall fair rate of return or cost of capital for the
14	regulated electric distribution service of Liberty Utilities (Granite State Electric)
15	Corp. d/b/a Liberty Utilities ("Granite State" or the "Company") and to evaluate
16	Granite State's rate of return testimony in this proceeding.
17	
18	Q. How is your testimony organized?
19	A. First, I will review my cost of capital recommendation for Liberty Utilities (Granite
20	State Electric), and review the primary areas of contention between Granite State's
21	rate of return position and Staff's. Second, I provide an assessment of capital costs
22	in today's capital markets. Third, I discuss my proxy group of electric utility

1	recommendations for the Company's capital structure and debt cost rate. Fifth, I
2	discuss the concept of the cost of equity capital, and then estimate the equity cost rate
3	for Liberty. Finally, I critique the Company's rate of return analysis and testimony.
4	I have a table of contents just after the title page for a more detailed outline.
5	
6	A. Overview
7	
8	Q. What comprises a utility's "rate of return"?
9	A. A company's overall rate of return consists of three main categories: (1) capital
10	structure (i.e., ratios of short-term debt, long-term debt, preferred stock and
11	common equity); (2) cost rates for short-term debt, long-term debt, and preferred
12	stock; and (3) common equity cost, otherwise known as Return on Equity
13	("ROE").
14	
15	Q. What is a utility's ROE intended to reflect?
16	A. An ROE is most simply described as the allowed rate of profit for a regulated
17	company. In a competitive market, a company's profit level is determined by a
18	variety of factors, including the state of the economy, the degree of competition a
19	company faces, the ease of entry into its markets, the existence of substitute or
20	complementary products/services, the company's cost structure, the impact of
21	technological changes, and the supply and demand for its services and/or products.
22	For a regulated monopoly, the regulator determines the level of profit available to
23	the utility. The United States Supreme Court established the guiding principles

for establishing an appropriate level of profitability for regulated public utilities in two cases: (1) *Bluefield* and (2) *Hope*.¹ In those cases, the Court recognized that the fair rate of return on equity should be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the company's financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the company's credit and to attract capital.

7 Thus, the appropriate ROE for a regulated utility requires determining the 8 market-based cost of capital. The market-based cost of capital for a regulated firm 9 represents the return investors could expect from other investments, while 10 assuming no more and no less risk. The purpose of all of the economic models 11 and formulas in cost of capital testimony (including those presented later in my 12 testimony) is to estimate, using market data of similar-risk firms, the rate of return 13 equity investors require for that risk-class of firms in order to set an appropriate 14 ROE for a regulated firm.

15

16 **Q.** Please review the company's proposed rate of return.

A. The Company has proposed a capital structure of 45.0% long-term debt and 55.0%
common equity. The Company has recommended a long-term debt cost rate of
5.97%. Granite State witness Mr. John Cochran has recommended a common

¹ Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ("Hope") and Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) ("Bluefield").

1	equity cost rate	of 10.0%	for the electric	distribution	operations of	Granite State
1	equity cost fate	01 10.070	Ior the electric	uisuibuiloii	operations of	Orallice State.

2 The Company's overall proposed rate of return is 8.19%.

3

4 Q. What are your recommendations regarding the appropriate rate of return for

5 **Granite State?**

6 A. I have reviewed the Company's proposed capital structure and overall cost of 7 capital. I have used a capital structure that is more reflective of the capital 8 structures of electric utility companies. I am using a capital structure consisting 9 of 50.0% debt and 50.00% common equity. To estimate an equity cost rate for the 10 Company, I have applied the Discounted Cash Flow Model ("DCF") and the 11 Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") to my proxy group of electric utility 12 companies ("Electric Proxy Group"). My recommendation is that the appropriate 13 ROE for the Company is 8.25%. This figure is at the upper end of my equity cost 14 rate range of 6.9% to 8.25%. Combined with my recommended capitalization 15 ratios and senior capital cost rate, my overall rate of return or cost of capital for 16 the Company is 7.11% as summarized in Attachment JRW-3.

17 18

Table 1
Recommended Cost of Capital

	Capitalization	Cost	Weighted	
Capital Source	Ratios	Rate	Cost Rate	
Long-Term Debt	50.00%	5.97%	2.99%	
Common Equity	<u>50.00%</u>	<u>8.25%</u>	<u>4.13%</u>	
Total Capitalization	100.00%		7.11%	

19

20 Q. Isn't your ROE recommendation low by historic standards?

21 A. Yes. But, as I discuss in my testimony, with interest rates near historic lows and

1	stock prices near historic highs, capital costs are at historic lows. In addition, I show
2	that utility stocks have performed extremely well in this economic environment.
3	
4	B. Primary Rate of Return Issues in this Case
5	
6	Q. Please summarize the primary issues regarding rate of return in this
7	proceeding.
8	A. The primary rate of return issues in this case are the appropriate capital structure
9	and ROE for the Company.
10	Capital Structure - The Company has proposed a hypothetical capital structure that
11	includes a common equity ratio that is higher than the average common equity
12	ratios (1) employed by the proxy group, (2) approved for electric delivery
13	companies. I have used a capital structure with 50% debt and 50% common equity
14	which is more reflective of the capital structures of electric utilities.
15	The Company's ROE Analysis is Out-of-Date - The Company ROE study was
16	prepared in March of this year. Since that time, the Federal Reserve has cut the
17	federal funds rate three times and the 30-year Treasury rate has fallen about
18	seventy-five basis points. Capital costs are lower now than when the Company's
19	case was filed.
20	DCF Approach – Mr. Cochran and I have both employed the traditional constant-
21	growth DCF model. Mr. Cochran has also used a multi-stage growth version of
22	the model. There are several errors in Mr. Cochran's DCF analyses: (1) he gives
23	little weight to his constant-growth DCF results; (2) he has exclusively used the

1 overly optimistic and upwardly biased EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street 2 analysts and Value Line; (3) the terminal growth rate of 5.40% in his multi-stage 3 DCF model is inflated and does not reflect the prospective economic growth in the 4 U.S. and is about 100 basis points above the projected long-term GDP growth; and (4) he has claimed that the DCF results underestimate the market-determined cost 5 6 of equity capital due to high utility stock valuations and low dividend yields. On 7 the other hand, when developing the DCF growth rate that I have used in my analysis, 8 I have reviewed thirteen growth rate measures including historical and projected 9 growth rate measures and have evaluated growth in dividends, book value, and 10 earnings per share.

<u>CAPM Approach</u> – The CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free 11 12 interest rate, beta, and the market or risk premium. The primary issue with Mr. 13 Cochran's CAPM is his market risk premium of 13.49%. There are problems 14 with Mr. Cochran's CAPM analyses. First, the 13.49% market risk premium is 15 much larger than: (1) indicated by historic stock and bond return data; and (2) 16 found in the published studies and surveys of the market risk premium. Second, 17 the 13.49% market risk premium is based on totally unrealistic assumptions of 18 future economic and earnings growth and stock returns. To compute his market 19 risk premium, Mr. Cochran has applied the DCF to the S&P 500 and employed 20 analysts' three-to-five-year earnings per share ("EPS") growth-rate projections as 21 a growth rate to compute an expected market return and market risk premiums As 22 I demonstrate later in my testimony, the EPS growth-rate projection used for the 23 S&P 500 and the resulting expected market return and market risk premium include totally unrealistic assumptions regarding future economic and earnings
 growth and stock returns.

3 As I highlight in my testimony, there are three procedures for estimating a 4 market risk premium – historic returns, surveys, and expected return models. I 5 have used a market risk premium of 5.75%, which: (1) factors in all three 6 approaches – historic returns, surveys, and expected return models – to estimate a 7 market premium; and (2) employs the results of many studies of the market risk 8 premium. As I note, the 5.75% figure reflects the market risk premiums: (1) 9 determined in recent academic studies by leading finance scholars; (2) employed 10 by leading investment banks and management consulting firms; and (3) found in 11 surveys of companies, financial forecasters, financial analysts, and corporate 12 CFOs.

Flotation Costs - Mr. Cochran's recommendation includes a consideration of equity flotation costs and size in his determination of the appropriate ROE for Granite State. Yet, Mr. Cochran has not identified any flotation costs that have been paid by Granite State. Therefore, the Company should not be rewarded with a higher ROE that includes flotation costs when the Company has not paid any such costs. Furthermore, the Commission has traditionally not allowed flotation costs.

20 <u>Company Size</u> – Mr. Cochran's ROE recommendation also includes a 21 consideration of a size premium for the Company. However, as I show, any such

1		premiums for size is not appropriate for a regulated public utility. In addition, the
2		Commission has traditionally not allowed a size premium.
3		
4		II. Capital Market Conditions and Authorized ROEs
5		
6	Q.	Please review the Federal Reserve's decisions to raise the federal funds rate
7		in recent years.
8	A.	On December 16, 2015, the Federal Reserve increased its target rate for federal
9		funds from 0.25 to 0.50 percent. ² This increase came after the rate was kept in the
10		0.00 to 0.25 percent range for over five years in order to spur economic growth in
11		the wake of the financial crisis associated with the Great Recession. As the
12		economy has improved, with lower unemployment, steady but slow GDP growth,
13		the Federal Reserve has increased the target federal funds rate on eight additional
14		occasions: December 2016; March, June, and December of 2017; and March, June,
15		September, and December of 2018.
16	Q.	How have long-term rates responded to the actions of the Federal Reserve?
17	A.	Figure 1, below, shows the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds over the period of
18		2015-2019. I have highlighted the dates when the Federal Reserve increased the
19		federal funds rate. The 30-year Treasury yield hit its lowest point in the 2015-
20		2016 timeframe in the summer of 2016 and subsequently increased with
21		improvements in the economy. Financial markets moved significantly in the wake

² The federal funds rate is set by the Federal Reserve and is the borrowing rate applicable to the most creditworthy financial institutions when they borrow and lend funds <u>overnight</u> to each other.

2	market gained more than 10% and the 30-year Treasury yield increased about 50
3	basis points to 3.2% by year-end 2016. However, over the past three years, even
4	as the Federal Reserve has increased the federal funds rate, the yield on thirty-yea
5	bonds remained in the 2.8% to 3.4% range through 2018. These yields peaked a
6	3.48% in November of 2018, shortly before the December 2018 rate increase by
7	the Federal Reserve.
8	Q. Please review long-term treasury yields in 2019.
9	A. Despite the Fed's efforts to stimulate the economy, economic growth and inflation
10	have remained low, even with record low unemployment levels. The rate increase
11	in December of 2018 was seen by many as maybe too aggressive. Also, with the
12	imposition of trade tariffs aimed at China, economic growth and inflation in the
13	U.S. have remained at low levels. This led the Federal Reserve to cut the federa
14	fund rate to the 2.0%-2.25% range in July of 2019. Thirty-year Treasury yields
15	which began the year in the 3.0% range declined significantly in the second quarte
16	and, in August, declined to record lows and even traded below 2.0%. As a result
17	the Federal Reserve has cut the discount rate two more times since the July rate
18	cut – in September and October. The irony is, despite the record low levels, the
19	30-year Treasury yield in the U.S. is still somewhat higher than the governmen
20	bond rates in Japan, the U.K., Germany, and much of the rest of Europe.
21	

of the results in the U.S. presidential election on November 8, 2016. The stock




Figure 1 Thirty-Year Treasury Yield and Federal Reserve Fed Funds Rate Increases

1

3

4 5 6

7 Q. Why have long-term treasury yields remained in the 2.0%-3.0% range?

8 A. Whereas the Federal Reserve can directly affect short-term rates by adjustments 9 to the federal funds rate, long-term rates are primarily driven by expected economic growth and inflation.³ The relationship between short- and long-term 10 11 rates is normally evaluated using the yield curve. The yield curve depicts the 12 relationship between the yield-to-maturity and the time-to-maturity for U.S. 13 Treasury bills, notes, and bonds. Figure 2, below, shows the yield curve on a semi-14 annual basis since the Federal Reserve started increasing the federal funds rate at 15 the end of 2015. It shows that, from the time the Federal Reserve began increasing 16 the federal funds rate in 2015 and until 2018, with the exception of mid-year 2016,

³ Whereas economic growth picked up in 2018, partly in response to the personal and corporate tax cuts, projected real GDP growth for 2019 and beyond remains in the 2.0% to 2.5% range. In addition, inflation remains low and is also in the 2.0% to 2.5% range.


the 30-year Treasury yield has remained in the 2.8%-3.4% range over this time
frame despite the fact that short-term rates have increased from near 0.0% to about
2.50%. As such, long-term interest rates and capital costs did not increase in any
meaningful way even with the Federal Reserve's actions and the increase in shortterm rates.

6 In 2019, with the large decline in long-term Treasury rates, the concern has 7 been an "inverted yield curve." An inverted yield curve occurs when short-term 8 Treasury yields are above long-term Treasury yields and is commonly associated 9 with a pending recession. In Figure 2, the yields curve for November 1, 2019, is 10 shown in green and is not quite inverted, due in large part to the three rate cuts.

Figure 2




12 13





16 17 Date Source: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interestrates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear&year=2019




19 companies.


20 A. Over the past five years, with historically low interest rates and capital costs,

21 authorized ROEs for electric utility and gas distribution companies have slowly

1	declined to reflect the low capital cost environment. In Figure 3, below, I have
2	graphed the quarterly authorized ROEs for electric and gas companies from 2000
3	to 2018. There is a clear downward trend in the data. On an annual basis, these
4	authorized ROEs for electric utilities have declined from an average of 10.01% in
5	2012, 9.8% in 2013, 9.76% in 2014, 9.58% in 2015, 9.60% in 2016, 9.68% in
6	2017, 9.56% in 2018, and 9.56% in the first three quarters of 2019, according to
7	Regulatory Research Associates. ⁴







14 differ from the authorized ROEs for integrated electric utilities?

15 A. Yes. One consistent factor in electric utility authorized ROEs is that the ROEs for


16 delivery or distribution companies have been below those of vertically integrated


⁴ S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2019. The electric utility authorized ROEs exclude the authorized ROEs in Virginia, which include generation adders.

1	utilities. This is shown in Figure 4. The lower authorized ROEs are usually
2	attributed to the fact that delivery or distribution companies do not own and
3	operate electric generation which is presumed to be the riskier part of electric
4	utility operations. I believe that Commissions in states who have deregulated
5	recognize the lesser risk and award lower ROEs. The authorized ROEs for electric
6	delivery companies have been 30-50 basis points below those of vertically-
7	integrated electric utilities in recent years. Over the 2018-19 time period, the
8	average authorized ROE for electric delivery companies was 9.40%. ⁵

Figure 4 Authorized ROEs for Vertically Integrated versus







1	III. <u>Proxy Group Selection</u>
2	
3	Q. Please describe your approach to developing a fair rate of return
4	recommendation for Granite State.
5	A. To develop a fair rate of return recommendation for the Company, I have evaluated
6	the return requirements of investors on the common stock of a proxy group of
7	publicly-held electric distribution companies.
8	Q. Please describe your proxy group of electric companies.
9	A. I am using the proxy group developed by Mr. Cochran. He uses screening criteria
10	similar to those that I use. I have excluded El Paso since it is being acquired. With
11	that exception, there are twenty-six companies in the Electric Proxy Group
12	Summary financial statistics for the Electric Proxy Group are listed on page 1
13	of Attachment JRW-4. The median operating revenues and net plant among
14	members of the Electric Proxy Group are \$5,283.5 million and \$18,454.3 million,
15	respectively. The group receives, on average, 81% of revenues from regulated
16	electric operations, and have average BBB+ and Baa1 average issuer credit ratings
17	from S&P and Moody's, a median common equity ratio of 46.0%, and a median
18	earned return on common equity of 9.6%.
19	Q. How does the investment risk of the Company compare to that of the Electric
20	Proxy Group?
21	A. I believe that bond ratings provide a good assessment of the investment risk of a
22	company. Attachment JRW-4 also shows S&P and Moody's issuer credit ratings
23	for the companies in the Electric Proxy Group. These average S&P and Moody's

1	issuer credit ratings for the group are BBB+ and Baa1. Granite State is not rated
2	by any rating agencies. Granite State's parent, Liberty Utilities, is rated BBB by
3	S&P. However, this is a corporate-wide credit rating for Liberty Utilities ("LU")
4	owner, Algonquin Power and Utilities Corp ("APUC"). APUC owns Algonquin
5	Power Company, an independent power producer as well as LU. As indicated in
6	a recent S&P report, APUC's credit rating benefits from the stable cash flows of
7	LU. ⁶ APUC and LU are also rated by DBRS Limited, primarily a credit agency
8	for Canadian companies. The DBRS ratings for APUC and LU are BBB (stable). ⁷
9	Overall, these credit ratings suggest that Granite State is at the high end of the
10	investment risk spectrum of the proxy group. However, APUC's unregulated
11	power business, acquisitions, and more highly-levered balance sheet would impact
12	these ratings in a negative way.
13	

- Q. How does the investment risk of the electric group compare based on the
 various risk metrics published by *Value Line*?
- A. On page 2 of Attachment JRW-2, I have assessed the riskiness of the electric
 group using five different risk measures. These risk measures include Beta (0.56),
 Financial Strength (A), Safety (1.8), Earnings Predictability (81), and Stock Price
 Stability (96). On balance, these measures suggest that the Electric Proxy Group
 is low risk.

⁶ Standard & Poor's Rating Services, Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp., January 2, 2019 Provided in response to Staff 8-6, Attachment Staff 8-6.4. See Attachment JRW-2.

⁷ As provided in Company response to Staff 8-7.2. See Attachment JRW-2.

2	
3	Q. Please describe Granite State's proposed capital structure and senior capital
4	cost rate.
5	A. The Company has proposed a capital structure of 45.0% long-term debt and 55.0%
6	common equity and a long-term debt cost rate of 5.97%.
7	Q. What are the average common equity ratios in the capitalizations of the proxy
8	group?
9	A. As shown in Attachment JRW-2, the median common equity ratio for the companies
10	in the Electric Proxy Group is 46.0%. This indicates that the Company's proposed
11	capitalization has a higher common equity ratio than the proxy group. It should be
12	noted that the capitalization ratios of the proxy groups include total debt which
13	consists of both short-term and long-term debt. In assessing financial risk, short-term
14	debt is included because, just like long-term debt, short-term has a higher claim on
15	the assets and earnings of the company and requires timely payment of interest and
16	repayment of principal.
17	Q. How does the Company's proposed capitalization compare to the average
18	capitalization adopted by state utility commissions for electric delivery
19	companies?
20	A. Over the 2018-19 time period, the average authorized common equity ratio for

Capital Structure Ratios and Debt Cost Rate

21

1

IV.

electric delivery companies was 50.16%.8 Therefore, the Company's proposed

⁸ S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2019. The electric utility authorized ROEs exclude the authorized ROEs in Virginia which include generation adders.

1		capital structure includes a higher common equity ratio and lower financial risk
2		than the average authorized capitalization in the U.S. for electric delivery
3		companies by state regulatory commissions.
4		
5	Q.	Given that the Company's proposed capitalization has a higher common
6		equity ratio than the average common equity ratios (1) employed by the proxy
7		group, (2) approved for electric delivery companies, what capital structure
8		and debt cost rate are you recommending for Granite State?
9	A.	I am recommending a capital structure composed of 50.0% long-term debt and
10		50.0% common equity. I will use the Company's proposed long-term debt cost
11		rate of 5.97%.
12		
12 13		V. <u>The Cost of Common Equity Capital</u>
		V. <u>The Cost of Common Equity Capital</u> A. Overview
13	Q.	
13 14	Q.	A. Overview
13 14 15	-	A. Overview Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a
13 14 15 16	-	A. Overview Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a public utility?
 13 14 15 16 17 	-	A. Overview Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a public utility? In a competitive industry, the return on a firm's common equity capital is
13 14 15 16 17 18	-	A. Overview Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a public utility? In a competitive industry, the return on a firm's common equity capital is determined through the competitive market for its goods and services. Due to the
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	-	A. Overview Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a public utility? In a competitive industry, the return on a firm's common equity capital is determined through the competitive market for its goods and services. Due to the capital requirements needed to provide utility services and the economic benefit
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 	-	A. Overview Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a public utility? In a competitive industry, the return on a firm's common equity capital is determined through the competitive market for its goods and services. Due to the capital requirements needed to provide utility services and the economic benefit to society from avoiding duplication of these services and the construction of

4	O. Please provide an overview of the cost of capital in the context of the theory
3	on capital to attract investors.
2	to meet the operating and capital costs of the utility, <i>i.e.</i> , provide an adequate return
1	seeks to establish prices that are fair to consumers and, at the same time, sufficient

Q. Please provide an overview of the cost of capital in the context of the theory

5 of the firm.

6 A. The total cost of operating a business includes the cost of capital. The cost of 7 common equity capital is the expected return on a firm's common stock that the 8 marginal investor would deem sufficient to compensate for risk and the time value 9 of money. In equilibrium, the expected and required rates of return on a 10 company's common stock are equal.

11 Normative economic models of a company or firm, developed under very 12 restrictive assumptions, provide insight into the relationship between a firm's 13 performance or profitability, capital costs, and the value of the firm. Under the 14 economist's ideal model of perfect competition, where entry and exit are costless, 15 products are undifferentiated, and there are increasing marginal costs of 16 production, firms produce up to the point where price equals marginal cost. Over 17 time, a long-run equilibrium is established where price of the firm equals average 18 cost, including the firm's capital costs. In equilibrium, total revenues equal total 19 costs, and because capital costs represent investors' required return on the firm's 20 capital, actual returns equal required returns, and the market value must equal the 21 book value of the firm's securities.

22 In a competitive market, firms can achieve competitive advantage due to 23 product-market imperfections. Most notably, companies can gain competitive

1	advantage through product differentiation (adding real or perceived value to
2	products) and by achieving economies of scale (decreasing marginal costs of
3	production). Competitive advantage allows firms to price products above average
4	cost and thereby earn accounting profits greater than those required to cover capital
5	costs. When these profits are in excess of those required by investors, or when a
6	firm earns a return on equity in excess of its cost of equity, investors respond by
7	valuing the firm's equity in excess of its book value.
8	James M. McTaggart, founder of the international management consulting
9	firm Marakon Associates, described this essential relationship between the return
10	on equity, the cost of equity, and the market-to-book ratio in the following manner:
11	Fundamentally, the value of a company is determined by the cash
12	flow it generates over time for its owners, and the minimum
13	acceptable rate of return required by capital investors. This "cost of
14	equity capital" is used to discount the expected equity cash flow,
15	converting it to a present value. The cash flow is, in turn, produced
16	by the interaction of a company's return on equity and the annual
17	rate of equity growth. High return on equity (ROE) companies in

low-growth markets, such as Kellogg, are prodigious generators of
cash flow, while low ROE companies in high-growth markets, such
as Texas Instruments, barely generate enough cash flow to finance
growth.

22 A company's ROE over time, relative to its cost of equity, also 23 determines whether it is worth more or less than its book value. If 24 its ROE is consistently greater than the cost of equity capital (the 25 investor's minimum acceptable return), the business is economically 26 profitable and its market value will exceed book value. If, however, 27 the business earns an ROE consistently less than its cost of equity, 28 it is economically unprofitable and its market value will be less than book value.⁹ 29

⁹ James M. McTaggart, "The Ultimate Poison Pill: Closing the Value Gap," *Commentary* (Spring 1986), p.3.

1		As such, the relationship between a firm's return on equity, cost of equity, and
2		market-to-book ratio is relatively straightforward. A firm that earns a return on
3		equity above its cost of equity will see its common stock sell at a price above its
4		book value. Conversely, a firm that earns a return on equity below its cost of
5		equity will see its common stock sell at a price below its book value.
6	Q.	Please provide additional insights into the relationship between ROE and
7		market-to-book ratios.
8	A.	This relationship is discussed in a classic Harvard Business School case study
9		entitled "Note on Value Drivers." On page 2 of that case study, the author
10		describes the relationship very succinctly:
11 12 13 14 15		For a given industry, more profitable firms – those able to generate higher returns per dollar of equity – should have higher market-to-book ratios. Conversely, firms which are unable to generate returns in excess of their cost of equity [(K)] should sell for less than book value.
16		
17		<u>Profitability Value</u>
18		If $ROE > K$ then $Market/Book > 1$
19 20		If $ROE = K$ then Market/Book = 1If $ROE < K$ then Market/Book < 1^{10}
21		To assess the relationship by industry, as suggested above, I performed a
22		regression study between estimated ROE and market-to-book ratios using natural
23		gas distribution and electric utility companies. I used all companies in these two
24		industries that are covered by Value Line and have estimated ROE and market-to-
25		book ratio data. The results are presented in Attachment JRW-6. The average R-

¹⁰ Benjamin Esty, "Note on Value Drivers," Harvard Business School, Case No. 9-297-082, April 7, 1997.

1	square is 0.50. ¹¹ This demonstrates the strong positive relationship between ROEs
2	and market-to-book ratios for public utilities. Given that the market-to-book ratios
3	have been above 1.0 for a number of years, this also demonstrates that utilities
4	have been earning ROEs above the cost of equity capital for many years.
5	Q. What economic factors have affected the cost of equity capital for public
6	utilities?
7	A. Attachment JRW-7 provides indicators of public utility equity cost rates over the
8	past almost two decades.
9	Page 1 shows the yields on long-term A-rated public utility bonds. These
10	yields decreased from 2000 until 2003, and then hovered in the 5.50%-6.50%
11	range from mid-2003 until mid-2008. These yields peaked in November 2008 at
12	7.75% during the Great Recession. These yields have generally declined since
13	then, dropping below 4.0% on four occasions - in mid-2012, in early 2015, in the
14	summer of 2016, and in late 2017. These yields increased in 2018 but have fallen
15	back and declined with interest rates in general. As of the end of the third quarter
16	of 2019, the yield was 3.50%.
17	Page 2 of Attachment JRW-7 provides the dividend yields for electric utility
18	companies over the past 18 years. The dividend yields for the electric group
19	declined from 5.3% to 3.4% between the years 2000 to 2007, increased to over

¹¹ R-square measures the percent of variation in one variable (e.g., market-to-book ratios) explained by another variable (e.g., expected ROE). R-squares vary between zero and 1.0, with values closer to 1.0 indicating a higher relationship between two variables.

5.0% in 2009, and have declined steadily since that time. The average dividend
 yield was 3.3% in 2018.

3 Average earned returns on common equity and market-to-book ratios for 4 electric utilities are on page 3 of Attachment JRW-7. For the electric group, earned 5 returns on common equity have declined gradually over the years. In the past three 6 years, the average earned ROE for the group has been in the 9.0% to 10.0% range. 7 The average market-to-book ratios for this group declined to about 1.1X in 2009 8 during the financial crisis and have increased since that time. As of 2018, the 9 average market-to-book for the group was 1.80X. This means that, for at least the 10 last decade, returns on common equity for electric utilities have been greater than 11 the cost of capital, and thus more than necessary to meet investors' required 12 returns. This also means that customers have been paying more than necessary to 13 support an appropriate profit level for regulated utilities.

14 Q. What factors determine investors' expected or required rate of return on15 equity?

16 A. The expected or required rate of return on common stock is a function of 17 market-wide as well as company-specific factors. The most important market 18 factor is the time value of money, as indicated by the level of interest rates in the 19 economy. Common stock investor requirements generally increase and decrease 20 with like changes in interest rates. The perceived risk of a firm is the predominant 21 factor that influences investor return requirements on a company-specific basis. A 22 firm's investment risk is often separated into business risk and financial risk. Business risk encompasses all factors that affect a firm's operating revenues and 23

1 expenses. Financial risk results from incurring fixed obligations in the form of 2 debt in financing its assets.

3 Q. How does the investment risk of utilities compare with that of other 4 industries?

5 A. Due to the essential nature of their service as well as their regulated status, public 6 utilities are exposed to a lesser degree of business risk than other, non-regulated 7 businesses. The relatively low level of business risk allows public utilities to meet 8 much of their capital requirements through borrowing in the financial markets, 9 thereby incurring greater than average financial risk. Nonetheless, the overall 10 investment risk of public utilities is below most other industries.

Page 4 of Attachment JRW-7 provides an assessment of investment risk for 97 11 12 industries as measured by beta, which, according to modern capital market theory, 13 is the only relevant measure of investment risk. These betas come from the *Value* 14 *Line Investment Survey.* The study shows that the investment risk of utilities is 15 very low. The average betas for electric, gas, and water utility companies are 0.60, 0.67, and 0.70, respectively.¹² As such, the cost of equity for utilities is the lowest 16 17 of all industries in the U.S., based on modern capital market theory.

18

O. What is the cost of common equity capital?

19 A. The costs of debt and preferred stock are normally based on historical or book 20 values and can be determined with a great degree of accuracy. The cost of 21 common equity capital, however, cannot be determined precisely and must instead

¹² The beta for the Value Line Electric Utilities is the simple average of Value Line's Electric East (0.55), Central (0.63), and West (0.62) group betas.

be estimated from market data and informed judgment. This return requirement
 of the stockholder should be commensurate with the return requirement on
 investments in other enterprises having comparable risks.

According to valuation principles, the present value of an asset equals the discounted value of its expected future cash flows. Investors discount these expected cash flows at their required rate of return that, as noted above, reflects the time value of money and the perceived riskiness of the expected future cash flows. As such, the cost of common equity is the rate at which investors discount expected cash flows associated with common stock ownership.

10 Q. How can the expected or required rate of return on common equity capital 11 bet determined?

A. Models have been developed to ascertain the cost of common equity capital for a
firm. Each model, however, has been developed using restrictive economic
assumptions. Consequently, judgment is required in selecting appropriate
financial valuation models to estimate a firm's cost of common equity capital, in
determining the data inputs for these models, and in interpreting the models'
results. All of these decisions must take into consideration the firm involved as
well as current conditions in the economy and the financial markets.

19 Q. How did you estimate the cost of equity capital for the Company?

A. Primarily, I rely on the DCF model to estimate the cost of equity capital. Given
the investment valuation process and the relative stability of the utility business,
the DCF model provides the best measure of equity cost rates for public utilities.
I have also performed a capital asset pricing model ("CAPM") study; however, I

1		give these results less weight because I believe that risk premium studies, of which
2		the CAPM is one form, provide a less reliable indication of equity cost rates for
3		public utilities.
4	Q.	Please explain why you believe that the CAPM provides a less reliable
5		indicator of equity cost rates?
	A.	I believe that the CAPM provides a less reliable measure of a utility's equity cost
		rate because it requires an estimate of the market risk premium. As discussed
		below, there is a wide variation in estimates of the market risk premium found in
		studies by academics and investment firms as well as in surveys of market

professionals.

B. DCF Approach

6

7

8

Q. Please describe the theory behind the traditional DCF model.

9 A. According to the DCF model, the current stock price is equal to the discounted 10 value of all future dividends that investors expect to receive from investment in 11 the firm. As such, stockholders' returns ultimately result from current as well as 12 future dividends. As owners of a corporation, common stockholders are entitled 13 to a *pro rata* share of the firm's earnings. The DCF model presumes that earnings 14 that are not paid out in the form of dividends are reinvested in the firm so as to 15 provide for future growth in earnings and dividends. The rate at which investors 16 discount future dividends, which reflects the timing and riskiness of the expected 17 cash flows, is interpreted as the market's expected or required return on the 1 common stock. Therefore, this discount rate represents the cost of common equity.

2 Algebraically, the DCF model can be expressed as:

3

7

8 where P is the current stock price, D_n is the dividend in year n, and k is the cost of
9 common equity.

10 Q. Is the DCF model consistent with valuation techniques employed by 11 investment firms?

12 A. Yes. Virtually all investment firms use some form of the DCF model as a valuation 13 technique. One common application for investment firms is called the three-stage 14 DCF or dividend discount model ("DDM"). The stages in a three-stage DCF 15 model are presented in Attachment JRW-8. This model presumes that a 16 company's dividend payout progresses initially through a growth stage, then 17 proceeds through a transition stage, and finally assumes a maturity (or steady-18 state) stage. The dividend-payment stage of a firm depends on the profitability of 19 its internal investments which, in turn, is largely a function of the life cycle of the 20 product or service.

Growth stage: Characterized by rapidly expanding sales, high profit
 margins, and an abnormally high growth in earnings per share. Because of highly
 profitable expected investment opportunities, the payout ratio is low. Competitors
 are attracted by the unusually high earnings, leading to a decline in the growth rate.

1

2

3

2. Transition stage: In later years, increased competition reduces profit margins and earnings growth slows. With fewer new investment opportunities, the company begins to pay out a larger percentage of earnings.

Maturity (steady-state) stage: Eventually, the company reaches a
position where its new investment opportunities offer, on average, only slightly
attractive ROEs. At that time, its earnings growth rate, payout ratio, and ROE
stabilize for the remainder of its life.

8 The constant-growth DCF model is appropriate when a firm is in the maturity 9 stage of the life cycle. In using this model to estimate a firm's cost of equity capital, 10 dividends are projected into the future using the different growth rates in the 11 alternative stages, and then the equity cost rate is the discount rate that equates the 12 present value of the future dividends to the current stock price.

13 Q. How do you estimate stockholders' expected or required rate of return using

14 **the DCF model?**

A. Under certain assumptions, including a constant and infinite expected growth rate,
 and constant dividend/earnings and price/earnings ratios, the DCF model can be
 simplified to the following:

21

where D_1 represents the expected dividend over the coming year and g is the expected growth rate of dividends. This is known as the constant-growth version of the DCF model. To use the constant-growth DCF model to estimate a firm's cost of equity, one solves for k in the above expression to obtain the following:

1 2 3 4 5	$k = \frac{D_1}{P} + g$
6	Q. In your opinion, is the constant-growth DCF model appropriate for public
7	utilities?
8	A. Yes. The economics of the public utility business indicate that the industry is in
9	the steady-state or constant-growth stage of a three-stage DCF. The economics
10	include the relative stability of the utility business, the maturity of the demand for
11	public utility services, and the regulated status of public utilities (especially the
12	fact that their returns on investment are effectively set through the ratemaking
13	process). The DCF valuation procedure for companies in this stage is the constant-
14	growth DCF. In the constant-growth version of the DCF model, the current
15	dividend payment and stock price are directly observable. However, the primary
16	problem and controversy in applying the DCF model to estimate equity cost rates
17	entails estimating investors' expected dividend growth rate.
18	Q. What factors should one consider when applying the DCF methodology?
19	A. One should be sensitive to several factors when using the DCF model to estimate
20	a firm's cost of equity capital. In general, one must recognize the assumptions
21	under which the DCF model was developed in estimating its components (the
22	dividend yield and the expected growth rate). The dividend yield can be measured
23	precisely at any point in time; however, it tends to vary somewhat over time.
24	Estimation of expected growth is considerably more difficult. One must consider
25	recent firm performance, in conjunction with current economic developments and

other information available to investors, to accurately estimate investors'
 expectations.

3 Q. What dividend yields have you reviewed?

A. I have calculated the dividend yields for the companies in the proxy group using
the current annual dividend and the 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day average stock
prices. These dividend yields are provided on page 2 of Attachment JRW-9. For
the Electric Proxy Group, the median dividend yields using the 30-day, 90-day,
and 180-day average stock prices range from 2.7% to 3.1%. Therefore, I am using
the 2.9% as the dividend yield which is the average of the 30-day dividend yields
for the Electric Proxy Group.

11 **Q.** Please discuss the appropriate adjustment to the spot dividend yield.

12 A. According to the traditional DCF model, the dividend yield term relates to the 13 dividend yield over the coming period. As indicated by Professor Myron Gordon, 14 who is commonly associated with the development of the DCF model for popular 15 use, this is obtained by: (1) multiplying the expected dividend over the coming 16 quarter by 4, and (2) dividing this dividend by the current stock price to determine 17 the appropriate dividend yield for a firm that pays dividends on a quarterly basis.¹³ 18 In applying the DCF model, some analysts adjust the current dividend for growth 19 over the coming year as opposed to the coming quarter. This can be complicated 20 because firms tend to announce changes in dividends at different times during the

¹³ Petition for Modification of Prescribed Rate of Return, Federal Communications Commission, Docket No. 79-05, Direct Testimony of Myron J. Gordon and Lawrence I. Gould at 62 (April 1980).

year. As such, the dividend yield computed based on presumed growth over the
 coming quarter as opposed to the coming year can be quite different.
 Consequently, it is common for analysts to adjust the dividend yield by some
 fraction of the long-term expected growth rate.

6

5

Q. Given this discussion, what adjustment factor do you use for your dividend vield?

- A. I adjust the dividend yield by one-half (1/2) of the expected growth so as to reflect
 growth over the coming year. The DCF equity cost rate ("K") is computed as:
- 10 K = [(D/P) * (1 + 0.5g)] + g
- 11

9

12 **Q.** Please discuss the growth rate component of the DCF model.

A. There is debate as to the proper methodology to employ in estimating the growth
component of the DCF model. By definition, this component is investors'
expectation of the long-term dividend growth rate. Presumably, investors use
some combination of historical and/or projected growth rates for earnings and
dividends per share and for internal or book-value growth to assess long-term
potential.

19 Q. What growth data have you reviewed for the proxy group?

A. I have analyzed a number of measures of growth for companies in the proxy group.
I reviewed *Value Line's* historical and projected growth rate estimates for earnings
per share ("EPS"), dividends per share ("DPS"), and book value per share
("BVPS"). In addition, I utilized the average EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall
Street analysts as provided by Yahoo and Zacks. These services solicit five-year

earnings growth rate projections from securities analysts and compile and publish
 the means and medians of these forecasts. Finally, I also assessed prospective
 growth as measured by prospective earnings retention rates and earned returns on
 common equity.

5 Q

6

Q. Please discuss historical growth in earnings and dividends as well as internal growth.

7 A. Historical growth rates for EPS, DPS, and BVPS are readily available to investors 8 and are presumably an important ingredient in forming expectations concerning 9 future growth. However, one must use historical growth numbers as measures of 10 investors' expectations with caution. In some cases, past growth may not reflect 11 future growth potential. Also, employing a single growth rate number (for 12 example, for five or ten years) is unlikely to accurately measure investors' 13 expectations, due to the sensitivity of a single growth rate figure to fluctuations in 14 individual firm performance as well as overall economic fluctuations (i.e., 15 business cycles). However, one must appraise the context in which the growth 16 rate is being employed. According to the conventional DCF model, the expected 17 return on a security is equal to the sum of the dividend yield and the expected long-18 term growth in dividends. Therefore, to best estimate the cost of common equity 19 capital using the conventional DCF model, one must look to long-term growth rate 20 expectations.

Internally generated growth is a function of the percentage of earnings retained within the firm (the earnings retention rate) and the rate of return earned on those earnings (the return on equity). The internal growth rate is computed as the retention rate times the return on equity. Internal growth is significant in
 determining long-run earnings and, therefore, dividends. Investors recognize the
 importance of internally generated growth and pay premiums for stocks of
 companies that retain earnings and earn high returns on internal investments.

5 **O**.

Q. Please discuss the services that provide analysts' EPS forecasts.

6 A. Analysts' EPS forecasts for companies are collected and published by a number of 7 different investment information services, including Institutional Brokers Estimate 8 System ("I/B/E/S"), Bloomberg, FactSet, Zacks, First Call and Reuters, among 9 others. Thompson Reuters publishes analysts' EPS forecasts under different product 10 names, including I/B/E/S, First Call, and Reuters. Bloomberg, FactSet, and Zacks publish their own set of analysts' EPS forecasts for companies. These services do 11 12 not reveal: (1) the analysts who are solicited for forecasts; or (2) the identity of the 13 analysts who actually provide the EPS forecasts that are used in the compilations 14 published by the services. I/B/E/S, Bloomberg, FactSet, and First Call are fee-based 15 services. These services usually provide detailed reports and other data in addition 16 to analysts' EPS forecasts. Thompson Reuters and Zacks do provide limited EPS 17 forecast data free-of-charge on the internet. Yahoo finance 18 (http://finance.yahoo.com) lists Thompson Reuters as the source of its summary EPS 19 forecasts. The Reuters website (www.reuters.com) also publishes EPS forecasts 20 from Thompson Reuters, but with more detail. Zacks (www.zacks.com) publishes 21 its summary forecasts on its website. Zacks estimates are also available on other 22 websites, such as msn.money (http://money.msn.com).

23 Q. Which of these EPS forecasts is used in developing a DCF growth rate?

A. The DCF growth rate is the long-term projected growth rate in EPS, DPS, and
 BVPS. Therefore, in developing an equity cost rate using the DCF model, the
 projected long-term growth rate is the projection used in the DCF model.

Q. Why do you not rely exclusively on the EPS forecasts of Wall Street analysts in

4 5

arriving at a DCF growth rate for the proxy group?

6 A. There are several reasons. First, the appropriate growth rate in the DCF model is 7 the dividend growth rate, not the earnings growth rate. Nonetheless, over the very 8 long term, dividends and earnings will have to grow at a similar growth rate. 9 Therefore, consideration must be given to other indicators of growth, including 10 prospective dividend growth, internal growth, as well as projected earnings 11 growth. Second, a 2011 study by Lacina, Lee, and Xu has shown that analysts' 12 long-term earnings growth rate forecasts are not more accurate at forecasting 13 future earnings than just using last year's earnings figure as the projected future 14 earnings number.¹⁴ Employing data over a 20-year period, these authors demonstrate that using the most recent year's EPS figure to forecast EPS in the 15 16 next 3-5 years proved to be just as accurate as using the EPS estimates from 17 analysts' long-term earnings growth rate forecasts. In the authors' opinion, these 18 results indicate that analysts' long-term earnings growth rate forecasts should be 19 used with caution as inputs for valuation and cost of capital purposes. Finally, and 20 most significantly, it is well known that the long-term EPS growth rate forecasts 21 of Wall Street securities analysts are overly optimistic and upwardly biased. This

¹⁴ M. Lacina, B. Lee & Z. Xu (2011), Advances in Business and Management Forecasting Vol. 8, Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101.

1	has been demonstrated in a number of academic studies over the years. ¹⁵ Hence,
2	using these growth rates as a DCF growth rate will provide an overstated equity
3	cost rate. On this issue, a study by Easton and Sommers (2007) found that
4	optimism in analysts' growth rate forecasts leads to an upward bias in estimates of
5	the cost of equity capital of almost 3.0 percentage points. ¹⁶
6	Q. Are the projected EPS growth rates of Value Line also overly optimistic and
7	upwardly biased?
8	A. Yes. A study by Szakmary, Conover, and Lancaster (2008) evaluated the accuracy
9	of Value Line's three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts using companies in
10	the Dow Jones Industrial Average over a thirty-year time period and found these
11	forecasted EPS growth rates to be significantly higher than the EPS growth rates
12	that these companies subsequently achieved. ¹⁷
13	Q. Is it your opinion that stock prices reflect the upward bias in the EPS growth

14 rate forecast?

¹⁵ The studies that demonstrate analysts' long-term EPS forecasts are overly-optimistic and upwardly biased include: R.D. Harris, "The Accuracy, Bias, and Efficiency of Analysts' Long Run Earnings Growth Forecasts," *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, pp. 725-55 (June/July 1999); P. DeChow, A. Hutton, and R. Sloan, "The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings," *Contemporary Accounting Research* (2000); K. Chan, L., Karceski, J., & Lakonishok, J., "The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates," *Journal of Finance* pp. 643–684, (2003); M. Lacina, B. Lee and Z. Xu, (2011), *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting (Vol. 8)*, Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101; and Marc H. Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, "Equity Analysts, Still Too Bullish," *McKinsey on Finance*, pp. 14-17, (Spring 2010).

¹⁶ Peter D. Easton & Gregory A. Sommers, "Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts," 45 J. ACCT. RES. 983–1015 (2007).

¹⁷ Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C. (2008). "An Examination of *Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections," *Journal of Banking & Finance*, May 2008, pp. 820-833.

1	A.	Yes, I do believe that investors are well aware of the bias in analysts' EPS growth
2		rate forecasts and stock prices, therefore, reflect the upward bias.
3	Q.	How does that affect the use of these forecasts in a DCF equity cost rate study?
4	A.	According to the DCF model, the equity cost rate is a function of the dividend yield
5		and expected growth rate. Since this bias is well known, stock prices and therefore
6		dividend yields reflect this bias. However, in the DCF model, the growth rate needs
7		to be adjusted downward from the projected EPS growth rate to reflect the upward
8		bias.
9	Q.	Please discuss the historical growth of the companies in the proxy group, as
10		provided by Value Line.
11	A.	Page 3 of Attachment JRW-9 provides the 5- and 10-year historical growth rates
12		for EPS, DPS, and BVPS for the companies in the proxy group, as published in
13		the Value Line Investment Survey. The median historical growth measures for

EPS, DPS, and BVPS for the Electric Proxy Group range from 4.0% to 4.8%, with
an average of the medians of 4.4%.

Q. Please summarize Value Line's projected growth rates for the companies in
the proxy group.

A. *Value Line's* projections of EPS, DPS, and BVPS growth for the companies in the
 proxy group are shown on page 4 of Attachment JRW-9. Due to the presence of
 outliers, the medians are used in the analysis. For the Electric Proxy Group, as

shown on page 4 of Attachment JRW-9, the medians range from 4.0% to 5.3%,
 with an average of the medians of 4.8%.¹⁸

Also provided on page 4 of Attachment JRW-9 are the prospective sustainable growth rates for the companies in the proxy group as measured by *Value Line*'s average projected retention rate and return on shareholders' equity. As noted above, sustainable growth is a significant and a primary driver of long-run earnings growth. For the Electric Proxy Group, the median prospective sustainable growth rate is 3.5%.

9 Q. Please assess growth for the proxy group as measured by analysts' forecasts
10 of expected 5-year eps growth.

11 A. Yahoo and Zacks collect, summarize, and publish Wall Street analysts' long-term 12 EPS growth rate forecasts for the companies in the proxy group. These forecasts 13 are provided for the companies in the proxy group on page 5 of Attachment JRW-14 9. I have reported both the mean and median growth rates for the group. Since 15 there is considerable overlap in analyst coverage between the two services, and not 16 all of the companies have forecasts from the different services, I have averaged the 17 expected five-year EPS growth rates from the two services for each company to 18 arrive at an expected EPS growth rate for each company. The mean/median of 19 analysts' projected EPS growth rates for the Electric Proxy Group are 5.0% and

¹⁸ It should be noted that *Value Line* uses a different approach in estimating projected growth. *Value Line* does not project growth from today, but *Value Line* projects growth from a three-year base period – 2016-2018 – to a projected three-year period for the period 2022-2024. Using this approach, the three-year based period can have a significant impact on the *Value Line* growth rate if this base period includes years with abnormally high or low earnings. Therefore, I evaluate these growth rates separately from analysts EPS growth rates.

1 5.3%, respectively.¹⁹

2

Q. Please summarize your analysis of the historical and prospective growth of the proxy group.

A. Page 6 of Attachment JRW-9 shows the summary DCF growth rate indicators for
the proxy group.

7 The historical growth rate indicators for my Electric Proxy Group imply a 8 baseline growth rate of 4.4%. The average of the projected EPS, DPS, and BVPS 9 growth rates from Value Line is 4.8%, and Value Line's projected sustainable 10 growth rate is 3.5%. The projected EPS growth rates of Wall Street analysts for 11 the Electric Proxy Group are 5.0% and 5.3% as measured by the mean and median 12 growth rates. The overall range for the projected growth rate indicators (ignoring 13 historical growth) is 3.5% to 5.3%. Giving primary weight to the projected EPS 14 growth rate of Wall Street analysts, I believe that the appropriate projected growth 15 rate range is 5.25%. This growth rate figure is clearly in the upper end of the range 16 of historic and projected growth rates for the Electric Proxy Group.

17 Q. What are the results from your application of the DCF model?

18 A. My DCF-derived equity cost rate for the group are summarized on page 1 of
19 Attachment JRW-10 and in Table 2 below.

20

- 21
- 22
- 23

¹⁹ Given variation in the measures of central tendency of analysts' projected EPS growth rates for the proxy group, I have considered both the means and medians figures in the growth rate analysis.

1 2	DC		Fable 2 quity Cost Rate	P/ROF	
2		Dividend	$1 + \frac{1}{2}$	DCF	Equity
		Yield	Growth Adjustment	Growth Rate	Cost Rate
2	Electric Proxy Group	2.90%	1.02625	5.25%	8.25%
3 4	The result for the E	lectric Proxy	Group is the 2.	90% dividend yie	eld, times the
5	one and one-half grow	th adjustme	nt of 1.02625,	plus the DCF gr	owth rate of
6	5.25%, which results in	an equity co	ost rate of 8.25%).	
7					
8	В	. Capital A	Asset Pricing M	odel	
9					
10	Q. Please discuss the Cap	oital Asset P	ricing Model ('	'CAPM'').	
11	A. The CAPM is a risk pro	emium appro	each to gauging	a firm's cost of ea	quity capital.
12	According to the risk	premium ap	proach, the cos	t of equity is the	e sum of the
13	interest rate on a risk-fr	ee bond (R _f)	and a risk prem	ium (RP), as in th	ne following:
14 15	$k = R_f$	+ R	Р		
16	The yield on long-t	erm U.S. Tre	easury securities	is normally used	as R _f . Risk
17	premiums are measured	in different	ways. The CAI	PM is a theory of	the risk and
18	expected returns of com	mon stocks.	In the CAPM, t	wo types of risk a	re associated
19	with a stock: firm-spe	cific risk or	unsystematic ri	sk, and market o	or systematic
20	risk, which is measured	d by a firm's	s beta. The only	y risk that invest	ors receive a
21	return for bearing is sys	stematic risk			

1	According to the CAPM, the expected return on a company's stock, which is also
2	the equity cost rate (K), is equal to:
3 4	$\boldsymbol{K} = (\boldsymbol{R}_f) + \boldsymbol{\beta} * [\boldsymbol{E}(\boldsymbol{R}_m) - (\boldsymbol{R}_f)]$
5	Where:
6	K represents the estimated rate of return on the stock;
7	$E(R_m)$ represents the expected return on the overall stock market. Frequently, the
8	'market' refers to the S&P 500;
9	(R_f) represents the risk-free rate of interest;
10	$[E(R_m) - (R_f)]$ represents the expected equity or market risk premium—the excess
11	return that an investor expects to receive above the risk-free rate for investing in
12	risky stocks; and
13	Beta—(B) is a measure of the systematic risk of an asset.
14	
15	To estimate the required return or cost of equity using the CAPM requires three
16	inputs: the risk-free rate of interest (R_f) , the beta (β) , and the expected equity or
17	market risk premium $[E(R_m) - (R_f)]$. R_f is the easiest of the inputs to measure – it
18	is represented by the yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. ß, the measure of
19	systematic risk, is a little more difficult to measure because there are different
20	opinions about what adjustments, if any, should be made to historical betas due to
21	their tendency to regress to 1.0 over time. And finally, an even more difficult input
22	to measure is the expected equity or market risk premium $(E(R_m) - (R_f))$. I will
23	discuss each of these inputs below.
24	O. Please discuss Attachment JRW10.

Q. Please discuss Attachment JRW10.

A. Attachment JRW-10 provides the summary results for my CAPM study. Page 1

shows the results, and the following pages contain the supporting data.

1 **Q.** Please discuss the risk-free interest rate.

A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds has usually been viewed as the riskfree rate of interest in the CAPM. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, in
turn, has been considered to be the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds with 30-year
maturities.

6 Q. What risk-free interest rate are you using in your CAPM?

7 A. As shown on page 2 of Attachment JRW-10, the yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury

8 bonds has been in the 2.0% to 4.0% range over the 2013–2019 time period. The

- 9 current 30-year Treasury yield is near the bottom of this range. Given the recent
- 10 range of yields, I have chosen to use the top end of the range as my risk-free
- 11 interest rate. Therefore, I am using 3.75% as the risk-free rate, or R_f , in my CAPM.
- 12 This is similar to the normalized risk-free interest rate used by the investment
- 13 advisory firm Duff & Phelps.²⁰

14 Q. Does the 3.75% risk-free interest rates take into consideration of forecasts of

- 15 higher interest rates?
- 16 A. No, it does not. Forecasts of higher interest rates have been notoriously wrong for
- 17 a decade. ²¹ My 3.75% risk-free interest rate takes into account the range of

²⁰ https://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/valuation-insights/valuation-insights-first-quarter-2019/us-equity-risk-premium-recommendation.

²¹ Ben Eisen, "Yes, 100% of economists were dead wrong about yields, Market Watch," October 22, 2014. Perhaps reflecting this fact, *Bloomberg* reported that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has stopped using the interest rate estimates of professional forecasters in the Bank's interest rate model due to the unreliability of those interest rate forecasts. See Susanne Walker and Liz Capo McCormick, "Unstoppable \$100 Trillion Bond Market Renders Models Useless," Bloomberg.com (June 2, 2014). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-01/the-unstoppable-100-trillion-bondmarket-renders-models-useless.html. Joe Weisenthal, "How Interest Rates Keep Making People on Wall Street Look Like Fools," Bloomberg.com, March 16. 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-16/how-interest-rates-keep-making-peopleon-wall-street-look-like-fools. Akin Oyedele, "Interest Rate Forecasters are Shockingly Wrong

interest rates in the past and effectively synchronizes the risk-free rate with the
market risk premium. The risk-free rate and the market risk premium are
interrelated in that the market risk premium is developed in relation to the riskfree rate. As discussed below, my market risk premium is based on the results of
many studies and surveys that have been published over time. Therefore, my riskfree interest rate of 3.75% is effectively a normalized risk-free rate of interest.

7

Q. What Betas are you employing in your CAPM?

8 A. Beta (β) is a measure of the systematic risk of a stock. The market, usually taken 9 to be the S&P 500, has a beta of 1.0. The beta of a stock with the same price 10 movement as the market also has a beta of 1.0. A stock whose price movement is greater than that of the market, such as a technology stock, is riskier than the 11 12 market and has a beta greater than 1.0. A stock with below average price 13 movement, such as that of a regulated public utility, is less risky than the market 14 and has a beta less than 1.0. Estimating a stock's beta involves running a linear 15 regression of a stock's return on the market return.

As shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-10, the slope of the regression line is
the stock's β. A steeper line indicates that the stock is more sensitive to the return
on the overall market. This means that the stock has a higher β and greater-thanaverage market risk. A less steep line indicates a lower β and less market risk.
Several online investment information services, such as Yahoo and Reuters,

Almost All of the Time," Business *Insider*, July 18, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/interest rate-forecasts-are-wrong-most-of-the-time-2015-7. "*Market Watch*," October 22, 2014.

provide estimates of stock betas. Usually these services report different betas for the same stock. The differences are usually due to: (1) the time period over which ß is measured; and (2) any adjustments that are made to reflect the fact that betas tend to regress to 1.0 over time. In estimating an equity cost rate for the proxy group, I am using the betas for the companies as provided in the *Value Line Investment Survey*. As shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-10, the median beta for the companies in the Electric Proxy Group is 0.55.

8

Q. Please discuss the market risk premium.

9 A. The market risk premium is equal to the expected return on the stock market (e.g., 10 the expected return on the S&P 500, $E(R_m)$ minus the risk-free rate of interest (R_f)). 11 The market risk premium is the difference in the expected total return between 12 investing in equities and investing in "safe" fixed-income assets, such as long-term 13 government bonds. However, while the market risk premium is easy to define 14 conceptually, it is difficult to measure because it requires an estimate of the 15 expected return on the market - $E(R_m)$. As is discussed below, there are different 16 ways to measure $E(R_m)$, and studies have come up with significantly different 17 magnitudes for $E(R_m)$. As Merton Miller, the 1990 Nobel Prize winner in 18 economics indicated, $E(R_m)$ is very difficult to measure and is one of the great mysteries in finance.²² 19

Q. Please discuss the alternative approaches to estimating the market risk premium.

²² Merton Miller, "The History of Finance: An Eyewitness Account," *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 2000, P. 3.

1	A. Page 4 of Attachment JRW-10 highlights the primary approaches to, and issues in,
2	estimating the expected market risk premium. The traditional way to measure the
3	market risk premium was to use the difference between historical average stock
4	and bond returns. In this case, historical stock and bond returns, also called ex
5	post returns, were used as the measures of the market's expected return (known as
6	the ex ante or forward-looking expected return). This type of historical evaluation
7	of stock and bond returns is often called the "Ibbotson approach" after Professor
8	Roger Ibbotson, who popularized this method of using historical financial market
9	returns as measures of expected returns. However, this historical evaluation of
10	returns can be a problem because: (1) ex post returns are not the same as ex ante
11	expectations; (2) market risk premiums can change over time, increasing when
12	investors become more risk-averse and decreasing when investors become less
13	risk-averse; and (3) market conditions can change such that ex post historical
14	returns are poor estimates of <i>ex ante</i> expectations.
15	The use of historical returns as market expectations has been criticized in

The use of historical returns as market expectations has been criticized in numerous academic studies as discussed later in my testimony. The general theme of these studies is that the large equity risk premium discovered in historical stock and bond returns cannot be justified by the fundamental data. These studies, which fall under the category "*Ex Ante* Models and Market Data," compute *ex ante* expected returns using market data to arrive at an expected equity risk premium. These studies have also been called "Puzzle Research" after the famous study by Mehra and Prescott in which the authors first questioned the magnitude of
 historical equity risk premiums relative to fundamentals.²³

3 In addition, there are a number of surveys of financial professionals regarding the market risk premium. There have also been several published surveys of 4 5 academics on the equity risk premium. CFO Magazine conducts a quarterly survey of CFOs, which includes questions regarding their views on the current 6 7 expected returns on stocks and bonds. Usually, over 200 CFOs participate in the survey.²⁴ Questions regarding expected stock and bond returns are also included 8 9 in the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's annual survey of financial 10 forecasters, which is published as the Survey of Professional Forecasters.²⁵ This 11 survey of professional economists has been published for almost fifty years. In 12 addition, Pablo Fernandez conducts annual surveys of financial analysts and 13 companies regarding the equity risk premiums they use in their investment and financial decision-making.²⁶ 14

15 **Q.** Please provide a summary of the market risk premium studies.

²³ Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, "The Equity Premium: A Puzzle," *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 145 (1985).

²⁴ DUKE/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook Survey, (June 2019), https://www.cfosurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Q2-2019-US-Toplines-1.pdf.

²⁵ Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Survey of Professional Forecasters (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-ofprofessional-forecasters/2019/spfq119.pdf?la=en. The Survey of Professional Forecasters was formerly conducted by the American Statistical Association ("ASA") and the National Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER") and was known as the ASA/NBER survey. The survey, which began in 1968, is conducted each quarter. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, in cooperation with the NBER, assumed responsibility for the survey in June 1990.

²⁶ Pablo Fernandez, Vitaly Pershin, and Isabel Fernandez Acín, "Market Risk Premium and Risk-Free Rate used for 59 countries in 2019: a survey," *IESE Business School*, (Apr. 2019), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3358901.

1	A. Derrig and Orr (2003), Fernandez (2007), and Song (2007) completed the most
2	comprehensive review of the research on the market risk premium. ²⁷ Derrig and
3	Orr's study evaluated the various approaches to estimating market risk premiums,
4	as well as the issues with the alternative approaches and summarized the findings
5	of the published research on the market risk premium. Fernandez examined four
6	alternative measures of the market risk premium – historical, expected, required,
7	and implied. He also reviewed the major studies of the market risk premium and
8	presented the summary market risk premium results. Song provides an annotated
9	bibliography and highlights the alternative approaches to estimating the market
10	risk premium.
10 11	risk premium. Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides a summary of the results of the
	-
11	Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides a summary of the results of the
11 12	Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides a summary of the results of the primary risk premium studies reviewed by Derrig and Orr, Fernandez, and Song,
11 12 13	Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides a summary of the results of the primary risk premium studies reviewed by Derrig and Orr, Fernandez, and Song, as well as other more recent studies of the market risk premium. In developing
11 12 13 14	Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides a summary of the results of the primary risk premium studies reviewed by Derrig and Orr, Fernandez, and Song, as well as other more recent studies of the market risk premium. In developing page 5 of Attachment JRW-10, I have categorized the studies as discussed on page
 11 12 13 14 15 	Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides a summary of the results of the primary risk premium studies reviewed by Derrig and Orr, Fernandez, and Song, as well as other more recent studies of the market risk premium. In developing page 5 of Attachment JRW-10, I have categorized the studies as discussed on page 5 of Attachment JRW-10. I have also included the results of studies of the

19 Q. Please discuss page 5 of Attachment JRW-10.

²⁷ See Richard Derrig & Elisha Orr, "Equity Risk Premium: Expectations Great and Small," Working Paper (version 3.0), Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts, (August 28, 2003); Pablo Fernandez, "Equity Premium: Historical, Expected, Required, and Implied," IESE Business School Working Paper, (2007); Zhiyi Song, "The Equity Risk Premium: An Annotated Bibliography," CFA Institute, (2007).

A. Page 5 of JRW-8 provides a summary of the results of the market risk premium
studies that I have reviewed. These include the results of: (1) the various studies
of the historical risk premium, (2) *ex ante* market risk premium studies, (3) market
risk premium surveys of CFOs, financial forecasters, analysts, companies and
academics, and (4) the Building Blocks approach to the market risk premium.
There are results reported for over thirty studies, and the median market risk
premium is 4.83%.

8 Q. Please highlight the results of the more recent risk premium studies and 9 surveys.

10 A. The studies cited on page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 include every market risk 11 premium study and survey I could identify that was published over the past two 12 decades and that provided a market risk premium estimate. Most of these studies 13 were published prior to the financial crisis that began in 2008. In addition, some 14 of these studies were published in the early 2000s at the market peak. It should be 15 noted that many of these studies (as indicated) used data over long periods of time 16 (as long as fifty years of data) and so were not estimating a market risk premium 17 as of a specific point in time (e.g., the year 2001). To assess the effect of the earlier 18 studies on the market risk premium, I have reconstructed page 5 of Attachment 19 JRW-10 on page 6 of Attachment JRW-10; however, I have eliminated all studies 20 dated before January 2, 2010. The median for this subset of studies is 5.24%.

21 **Q.** Please summarize the market risk premium studies and surveys.

22 A. As noted above, there are three approaches to estimating the market risk premium

23 – historic stock and bond returns, ex ante or expected returns models, and surveys.

1	The studies on page 6 of Attachment JRW-8 can be summarized in the following
2	manners:

<u>Historic Stock and Bond Returns</u> - Historic stock and bond returns suggest a
 market risk premium in the 4.40% to 6.26% range, depending on whether one uses
 arithmetic or geometric mean returns.


<u>Ex Ante Models</u> - Market risk premium studies that use expected or ex ante return
models indicate market risk premium in the range of 4.29% to 6.00%.

8 <u>Surveys</u> - Market risk premiums developed from surveys of analysts, companies,

- 9 financial professionals, and academics find lower market risk premium, with a
 10 range from 1.85% to 5.7%.
- Q. Please highlight the ex ante market risk premium studies and surveys that
 you believe are most timely and relevant.
- 13 A. I will highlight several studies/surveys.

14 *CFO Magazine* conducts a quarterly survey of CFOs, which includes questions 15 regarding their views on the current expected returns on stocks and bonds. In the 16 September 2019 CFO survey conducted by *CFO Magazine* and Duke University, 17 which included approximately 200 responses, the expected 10-year market risk 18 premium was 4.62%.²⁸ Figure 5, below, shows the market risk premium 19 associated with the CFO Survey, which has been in the 4.0% range in recent years.

²⁸ DUKE/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook Survey, at 61, (September 2019), https://www.cfosurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Q2-2019-US-Toplines-1.pdf.





7 Pablo Fernandez conducts annual surveys of financial analysts and companies 8 regarding the equity risk premiums they use in their investment and financial 9 decision-making.²⁹ His survey results are included on pages 5 and 6 of Attachment 10 JRW-10. The results of his 2019 survey of academics, financial analysts, and 11 companies, which included 4,000 responses, indicated a mean market risk premium employed by U.S. analysts and companies of 5.6%.³⁰ His estimated 12 13 market risk premium for the U.S. has been in the 5.00%-5.50% range in recent 14 years.

15

Professor Aswath Damodaran of NYU, a leading expert on valuation and the market risk premium, provides a monthly updated market risk premium which is

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 3.

²⁹ Pablo Fernandez, Vitaly Pershin, and Isabel Fernandez Acín, "Market Risk Premium and Risk-Free Rate used for 59 countries in 2019: a survey," *IESE Business School*, (Apr. 2019), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3358901.


1 based on projected S&P 500 EPS and stock price level and long-term interest rates.


2 His estimated market risk premium, shown graphically in Figure 6, below, for the

3 past almost sixty years, has primarily been in the range of 5.0% to 6.0% since

- 4 2010.
- 5 6

78





9 Duff & Phelps, an investment advisory firm, provides recommendations for 10 the risk-free interest rate and market risk premiums to be used in calculating the 11 cost of capital data. Their recommendations over the 2008-2019 time periods are 12 shown on page 7 of Attachment JRW-10. Duff & Phelps' recommended market 13 risk premium has been in the 5.0% to 6.0% range over the past decade. Most 14 recently, in the first quarter of 2019, Duff & Phelps increased its recommended 15 market risk premium from 5.0% to 5.50%.³¹

³¹ Duff & Phelps, "U.S. Equity Risk Premium Recommendation," (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/cost-of-capital/recommended-us-equityrisk-premium-and-corresponding-risk-free-rates.

1	KPMG is one of the largest public accounting firms in the world. Its
2	recommended market risk premium over the 2013-2019 time period is shown in
3	Panel A of page 8 of Attachment JRW-10. KPMG's recommended market risk
4	premium has been in the 5.50% to 6.50% range over this time period. In the first
5	quarter of 2019, KPMG increased its estimated market risk premium from 5.50%
6	to 5.75%. ³²
7	Finally, the website market-risk-premia.com provides risk-free interest rates,
8	implied market risk premiums, and overall cost of capital for thirty-six countries
9	around the world. These parameters for the U.S. over the 2002-2019 time period
10	are shown in Panel B of page 8 of Attachment JRW-10. As of July 31, 2019,
11	market-risk-premia.com estimated an implied cost of capital for the U.S. of 6.12%

12 consisting of a risk-free rate of 2.02% and an implied market risk premium of
13 4.10.³³

14 Q. Given these results, what market risk premium are you using in your CAPM?

A. The studies on page 6 of Attachment JRW-8, and more importantly the more
timely and relevant studies just cited, suggest that the appropriate market risk
premium in the U.S. is in the 4.0% to 6.0% range. I will use an expected market
risk premium of 5.75%, which is in the upper end of the range, as the market risk
premium. I gave most weight to the market risk premium estimates of the CFO
Survey, Duff & Phelps, KPMG, the Fernandez survey, and Damodaran. This is a

³² KPMG, "Equity Market Risk Premium Research Summary," (March 31, 2019), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/nl/pdf/2019/advisory/equity-market-risk-premiumresearch-summary-31032019.pdf.

³³ Market-Risk-Premia.com, "Implied Market-risk-premia (market risk premium): USA," http://www.market-risk-premia.com/us.html.

1 conservatively high estimate of the market risk premium considering the many

2 studies and surveys of the market risk premium.

3 Q. What equity cost rate is indicated by your CAPM analysis?

4 A. The results of my CAPM study for the proxy group are summarized on page 1 of

5 Attachment JRW-10 and in Table 3 below.

- 6 7
- 7 8

9

Table 3CAPM-derived Equity Cost Rate/ROE $K = \langle R \rangle + \beta * \langle E \langle R \rangle - \langle R \rangle \rangle$

	Risk-Free	Beta	Equity Risk	Equity
	Rate		Premium	Cost Rat
Electric Proxy Group	3.75%	0.55	5.75%	6.90%

10 For the Electric Proxy Group, the risk-free rate of 3.75% plus the product of the

11 beta of 0.55 times the equity risk premium of 5.75% results in a 6.90% equity cost

- 12 rate.
- 13

14

D. Equity Cost Rate Summary

15

16 **Q.** Please summarize the results of your equity cost rate studies.

17 A. My DCF and CAPM analyses for the Electric Proxy Group indicate equity cost

- 18 rates of 8.25% and 6.90%, respectively.
- 19 20

Table 4 ROFs Derived from DCF and CAPM Models

KOES DELIVED IT ONLDEF and CAT WI WIDDERS		
	DCF	CAPM
Electric Proxy Group	8.25%	6.90%

1 Q. Given these results, what is your estimated equity cost rate for the group? 2 A. Given these results, I conclude that the appropriate equity cost rate for companies 3 in the Electric Proxy Group is in the 6.90% to 8.25% range. However, since I rely 4 primarily on the DCF model, I am using the upper end of the range as the equity 5 cost rate. In addition, given that Granite State is in the upper end of the spectrum 6 of the investment risk of the proxy group companies, I conclude that the 7 appropriate equity cost rate for the Company is 8.25%. 8 **O.** Please indicate why an equity cost rate of 8.25% is appropriate for the electric 9 operations of Granite State. 10 A. There are a number of reasons why an equity cost rate of 8.25% is appropriate and 11 fair for the Company in this case: 12 1. As shown in Attachment JRW-7, page 1, capital costs for utilities, as 13 indicated by long-term bond yields, are still at historically low levels. In addition, 14 given low inflationary expectations and slow global economic growth, interest 15 rates are likely to remain at low levels for some time. 16 2. As shown in Attachment JRW-7, page 4, the electric utility industry is 17 among the lowest risk industries in the U.S. as measured by beta. As such, the 18 cost of equity capital for this industry is amongst the lowest in the U.S., according 19 to the CAPM. 20 4. The investment risk of Granite State, as indicated by the Company's S&P 21 and DBRS credit ratings, is at the upper end of the risk level of the proxy group. 22 Therefore, I have used the upper end of the equity cost rate range (8.25%).

1	5. The authorized ROEs for electric utility companies have declined from
2	10.01% in 2012, 9.8% in 2013, 9.76% in 2014, 9.58% in 2015, 9.60% in 2016,
3	9.68% in 2017, 9.56% in 2018, and 9.56% in the first three quarters of 2019. ³⁴ In
4	addition, the authorized ROEs for electric distribution companies have been 30-
5	40 basis points below those for integrated electric utilities. In my opinion,
6	authorized ROEs have lagged behind capital market cost rates, or in other words,
7	authorized ROEs have been slow to reflect low capital market cost rates.
8	However, the trend has been towards lower ROEs and the norm now is below 10%.
9	Hence, I believe that my recommended ROE reflects our present historically low
10	capital cost rates, and these low capital cost rates are finally being recognized as
11	the norm by state utility regulatory commissions.
12	Q. Please discuss your recommendation in light of a Moody's publication on the
13	subject of utility company ROEs and credit quality.
14	A. Moody's recently published an article on utility ROEs and credit quality. In the
15	article, Moody's recognizes that authorized ROEs for electric and gas companies
	25

16 are declining due to lower interest rates. ³⁵

The credit profiles of US regulated utilities will remain intact over 17 the next few years despite our expectation that regulators will 18 19 continue to trim the sector's profitability by lowering its authorized 20 returns on equity (ROE). Persistently low interest rates and a 21 comprehensive suite of cost recovery mechanisms ensure a low 22 business risk profile for utilities, prompting regulators to scrutinize 23 their profitability, which is defined as the ratio of net income to book 24 equity. We view cash flow measures as a more important rating 25 driver than authorized ROEs, and we note that regulators can lower

³⁴ S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2019.

³⁵ Moody's Investors Service, "Lower Authorized Equity Returns Will Not Hurt Near-Term Credit Profiles," March 10, 2015.

1 2 3	authorized ROEs without hurting cash flow, for instance by targeting depreciation, or through special rate structures.
4	Moody's indicates that with the lower authorized ROEs, electric and gas
5	companies are earning ROEs of 9.0% to 10.0%, but this is not impairing their
6	credit profiles and is not deterring them from raising record amounts of capital.
7	With respect to authorized ROEs, Moody's recognizes that utilities and regulatory
8	commissions are having trouble justifying higher ROEs in the face of lower
9	interest rates and cost recovery mechanisms.36
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Robust cost recovery mechanisms will help ensure that US regulated utilities' credit quality remains intact over the next few years. As a result, falling authorized ROEs are not a material credit driver at this time, but rather reflect regulators' struggle to justify the cost of capital gap between the industry's authorized ROEs and persistently low interest rates. We also see utilities struggling to defend this gap, while at the same time recovering the vast majority of their costs and investments through a variety of rate mechanisms.
19	Overall, this article further supports the belief that lower authorized ROEs are
20	unlikely to hurt the financial integrity of utilities or their ability to attract capital.
21	
22	Q. Do you believe that your 8.25% ROE recommendation meets Hope and
23	Bluefield standards?
24	A. Yes. As previously noted, according to the Hope and Bluefield decisions, returns
25	on capital should be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other


³⁶ Moody's Investors Service, "Lower Authorized Equity Returns Will Not Hurt Near-Term Credit Profiles," March 10, 2015.

1	investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the company's
2	financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the company's credit
3	and to attract capital.
4	Q. Are utilities able to attract capital with the lower ROEs?
5	A. As shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-7, utilities have been earning ROEs of
6	about 9.0% (on average) in recent years. As shown on page 1 of Attachment JRW-
7	4, utilities in the proxy group earned an average ROE of 9.20% in 2018. Moody's
8	also highlights in the article that utilities are raising about \$50 billion a year in debt
9	capital, despite the lower ROEs.37 Therefore, I believe that my ROE
10	recommendation meets the criteria established in the Hope and Bluefield decisions.
11	Q. Have the lower ROEs hurt the stock performance of utility stocks?
12	A. No. Figure 7 shows the Dow Jones Utility Index ("DJU") versus the S&P 500 since
13	January 1, 2019. ³⁸ Both the DJU and the S&P 500 are near or have achieved record
14	levels, and the DJU has performed right along with the S&P 500 over this time
15	period. As a result, with high stock prices, utility dividend yields and DCF equity
16	cost rates are low.
17 18 19	Figure 7 Dow Jones Utilities vs. S&P 500

Dow Jones Utilities vs. S&P 500 2019

37 Ibid.

38 https://finance.yahoo.com/.



A. The primary rate of return issues in this case are the appropriate capital structure
 and ROE for the Company.

<u>Capital Structure</u> - The Company has proposed a hypothetical capital structure that
 includes more common equity and less financial risk than other electric utilities. I
 have used a capital structure with 50% debt and 50% common equity which is
 more reflective of the capital structures of electric utilities.

7 The Company's ROE Analysis is Out-of-Date - The Company ROE study was 8 prepared in March of this year. Since that time, the Federal Reserve has cut the 9 federal funds rate three times and the 30-year Treasury rate has fallen about 75 10 basis points. Capital costs are lower now than when the Company's case was filed. 11 DCF Approach – Mr. Cochran and I have both employed the traditional constant-12 growth DCF model. Mr. Cochran has also used a multi-stage growth version of 13 the model. There are several errors in Mr. Cochran's DCF analyses: (1) he gives 14 little weight to his constant-growth DCF results; (2) he has exclusively used the 15 overly optimistic and upwardly biased EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street 16 analysts and Value Line; (3) the terminal growth rate of his multi-stage DCF model 17 is inflated and does not reflect the prospective economic growth in the U.S. and is 18 about 100 basis points above the projected long-term GDP growth; and (4) he has 19 claimed that the DCF results underestimate the market-determined cost of equity 20 capital due to high utility stock valuations and low dividend yields. On the other 21 hand, when developing the DCF growth rate that I have used in my analysis, I have 22 reviewed thirteen growth rate measures including historical and projected growth

2

rate measures and have evaluated growth in dividends, book value, and earnings per share.

3 CAPM Approach – The CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free 4 interest rate, beta, and the market or risk premium. The primary issue with Mr. 5 Cochran's CAPM is his market risk premium of 13.49%. The 13.49% market risk premium is much larger than: (1) indicated by historic stock and bond return 6 7 data; and (2) found in the published studies and surveys of the market risk 8 premium. In addition, the 13.49% market risk premium is based on totally 9 unrealistic assumptions of future economic and earnings growth and stock returns. 10 To compute his market risk premium, Mr. Cochran has applied the DCF to the 11 S&P 500 and employed analysts' three-to-five-year earnings per share ("EPS") 12 growth-rate projections as a growth rate to compute an expected market return and 13 market risk premiums As I demonstrate later in my testimony, the EPS growth-14 rate projection used for the S&P 500 and the resulting expected market return and 15 market risk premium include totally unrealistic assumptions regarding future 16 economic and earnings growth and stock returns.

Flotation Costs - Mr. Cochran's recommendation includes consideration of equity
 flotation costs and size in his determination of the appropriate ROE for Granite
 State. Yet, Mr. Cochran has not identified any flotation costs that have been paid

1	by Granite State. Therefore, the Company should not be rewarded with a higher		
2	ROE that includes flotation costs when the Company has not paid any such costs.		
3	Company Size – Mr. Cochran's ROE recommendation also includes a		
4	consideration of a size premium for the Company. However, as I show, any such		
5	premiums for size is not appropriate for a regulated public utility.		
6	The out-of-date ROE study and capital structure issues were addressed above.		
7	The other issues are discussed below.		
8			
9	A. The Company's DCF Approach		
10			
11	Q. Please summarize Mr. Cochran's DCF estimates.		
12	A. On pages 12-22 of his testimony and in Attachments JC-4 - JC-5, Mr. Cochran		
13	develops an equity cost rate by applying the DCF model to his proxy group. Mr.		
14	Cochran's DCF results are summarized in Panel A of page 2 of Attachment JRW-		
15	11 He uses constant-growth and multistage growth DCF models. Mr. Cochran uses		
16	three dividend yield measures (30, 90, and 180 days) in his DCF models. In his		
17	constant-growth DCF models, Mr. Cochran has relied on the forecasted EPS		
18	growth rates of Zacks, Yahoo Finance, and Value Line. His multi-stage DCF		
19	model uses analysts' EPS growth rate forecasts as a short-term growth rate and his		
20	projection of GDP growth of 5.40% as the long-term growth rate. For all three		
21	models, he reports Mean Low, Mean, and Mean High results. The average of his		
22	constant-growth and multi-stage growth DCF models is 8.98%.		

23 Q. What are the errors in Mr. Cochran's DCF analyses?

1	A. The primary issues in Mr. Cochran's DCF analyses are: (1) the lack of weight he
2	gives to his constant-growth DCF results; (2) his exclusive use of the overly
3	optimistic and upwardly biased EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts
4	and Value Line; (3) the use of an inflated terminal growth rate of 5.40% in his
5	multi-stage DCF model that it is not reflective of prospective economic growth in
6	the U.S. and is about 100 basis points above the projected long-term GDP growth;
7	and (4) he has claimed that the DCF results underestimate the market-determined
8	cost of equity capital due to high utility stock valuations and low dividend yields.
9	
10	
11 12	1. The Low Weight Given to the Constant-Growth DCF Results
13 14	
	Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an
14	
14 15	Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an
14 15 16	Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an equity cost rate for the company?
14 15 16 17	Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an equity cost rate for the company?A. Apparently, not a lot. The average of all of his mean constant-growth and multi-stage
14 15 16 17 18	 Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an equity cost rate for the company? A. Apparently, not a lot. The average of all of his mean constant-growth and multi-stage stage DCF equity cost rates is only 8.98%. Had he given these results more weight,
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an equity cost rate for the company? A. Apparently, not a lot. The average of all of his mean constant-growth and multi-stage stage DCF equity cost rates is only 8.98%. Had he given these results more weight, he would have arrived at a much lower equity cost rate recommendation.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an equity cost rate for the company? A. Apparently, not a lot. The average of all of his mean constant-growth and multi-stage stage DCF equity cost rates is only 8.98%. Had he given these results more weight, he would have arrived at a much lower equity cost rate recommendation.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. How much weight has Mr. Cochran given his DCF results in arriving at an equity cost rate for the company? A. Apparently, not a lot. The average of all of his mean constant-growth and multi-stage stage DCF equity cost rates is only 8.98%. Had he given these results more weight, he would have arrived at a much lower equity cost rate recommendation. 2. <u>Analysts' EPS Growth Rate Forecasts</u>

1	growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts and ignore other growth rate measures
2	in arriving at their expected growth rates for equity investments. As I previously
3	indicated, the appropriate growth rate in the DCF model is the dividend growth
4	rate, not the earnings growth rate. Hence, consideration must be given to other
5	indicators of growth, including historical prospective dividend growth, internal
6	growth, as well as projected earnings growth. In addition, a recent study by
7	Lacina, Lee, and Xu (2011) has shown that analysts' long-term earnings growth
8	rate forecasts are not more accurate at forecasting future earnings than naïve
9	random walk forecasts of future earnings. ³⁹ As such, the weight given to analysts'
10	projected EPS growth rates should be limited. And finally, and most significantly,
11	it is well-known that the long-term EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street
12	securities analysts are overly optimistic and upwardly biased. ⁴⁰ Hence, using
13	these growth rates as a DCF growth rate produces an overstated equity cost rate.
14	A recent study by Easton and Sommers (2007) found that optimism in analysts'
15	earnings growth rate forecasts leads to an upward bias in estimates of the cost of
16	equity capital of almost 3.0 percentage points. ⁴¹ Therefore, exclusive reliance on
17	these forecasts for a DCF growth rate results in failure of one the basic inputs in
18	the equation. In addition, as noted above, a study by Szakmary, Conover, and
19	Lancaster (2008) discovered that the three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts

⁴¹ Easton, P., & Sommers, G. (2007). Effect of analysts' optimism on estimates of the expected rate of return implied by earnings forecasts. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 45(5), 983–1015.

³⁹ M. Lacina, B. Lee and Z. Xu, *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting (Vol. 8)*, Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101

⁴⁰ See references in footnote 15.

of *Value Line*'s to be significantly higher than the EPS growth rates that these
 companies subsequently achieved.⁴²

3

Q. Have changes in regulations impacting Wall Street analysts and their research

4 impacted the upward bias in their projected EPS growth rates?

A. No. A number of the studies I have cited above demonstrate that the upward bias
has continued despite changes in regulations and reporting requirements over the
past two decades. This observation is highlighted by a 2010 McKinsey study
entitled "Equity Analysts: Still Too Bullish," which involved a study of the
accuracy of analysts' long-term EPS growth rate forecasts. The authors conclude
that after a decade of stricter regulation, analysts' long-term earnings forecasts
continue to be excessively optimistic. They made the following observation:⁴³

12 Alas, a recently completed update of our work only reinforces 13 this view—despite a series of rules and regulations, dating to 14 the last decade, that were intended to improve the quality of the 15 analysts' long-term earnings forecasts, restore investor 16 confidence in them, and prevent conflicts of interest. For 17 executives, many of whom go to great lengths to satisfy Wall 18 Street's expectations in their financial reporting and long-term 19 strategic moves, this is a cautionary tale worth remembering. 20 This pattern confirms our earlier findings that analysts typically 21 lag behind events in revising their forecasts to reflect new 22 economic conditions. When economic growth accelerates, the 23 size of the forecast error declines; when economic growth 24 slows, it increases. So as economic growth cycles up and down, 25 the actual earnings S&P 500 companies report occasionally 26 coincide with the analysts' forecasts, as they did, for example, 27 in 1988, from 1994 to 1997, and from 2003 to 2006. Moreover, 28 analysts have been persistently overoptimistic for the past 25

⁴² Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C. (2008). "An Examination of *Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections," *Journal of Banking & Finance*, May 2008, pp. 820-833.

⁴³ Marc H. Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, "Equity Analysts, Still Too Bullish," *McKinsey on Finance*, pp. 14-17, (Spring 2010) (emphasis added).

1 2 3	years, with estimates ranging from 10 to 12 percent a year, compared with actual earnings growth of 6 percent. Over this time frame, actual earnings growth surpassed forecasts in only	
4	two instances, both during the earnings recovery following a	
5	recession. On average, analysts' forecasts have been almost	
6	100 percent too high.	
7	This is the same charmotics mode in a <i>Dl</i> such as <i>Duringer up to stiple</i> 44. The	
8	This is the same observation made in a <i>Bloomberg Businessweek</i> article. ⁴⁴ The	
9	author concluded:	
10		
11	The bottom line: Despite reforms intended to improve Wall	
12		
13	rosy view of profit prospects.	
14		
15		
16	3. <u>The GDP Growth Rate in the Multi-Stage DCF Analysis</u>	
17		
18	Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochran's multi-stage DCF analysis.	
19	A. Mr. Cochran has employed a multi-stage growth DCF model; (1) the first-stage is	
20	the average projected analyst growth rate of Wall Street analysts as published by	
21	Yahoo Finance, Zacks, and Value Line; and (2) the terminal stage is his projected	
22	measure of long-term GDP growth. He uses a long-term nominal GDP growth	
23	rate of 5.40% which is based on (1) a real GDP growth rate of 3.22% which is	
24	calculated over the 1929-2018 time period and (2) an inflation rate of 2.18%.	
25	Q. What are the primary errors with Mr. Cochran's multi-stage DCF analysis?	
26	A There are two primary errors with Mr. Cochran's multi-stage DCF analysis; (1) the	;
27	first-stage DCF growth rate is the average projected EPS growth rate from Wall	

⁴⁴ Roben Farzad, "For Analysts, Things Are Always Looking Up," *Bloomberg Businessweek* (June 10, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-06-10/for-analysts-things-are-always-looking-up.

Street analysis which, as discussed above, are overly optimistic and upwardly biased; and (2) the long-term GDP growth rate is based on historical GDP growth and is about 100 basis points above long-term projections of GDP growth.

Q. Please identify the errors with Mr. Cochran's projected long-term GDP

4

5

3

growth rate of 5.40%.

6 A. There are two major errors in this analysis. First, Mr. Cochran has not provided any 7 theoretical or empirical support that long-term GDP growth is a reasonable proxy for 8 the expected growth rate of the companies in his proxy group. Five-year and ten-9 year historic measures of growth for earnings and dividends for electric utility 10 companies, as shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-9, suggest growth that is about 11 100 basis points below Mr. Cochran's 5.40% GDP growth rate. Mr. Cochran has 12 provided no evidence as to why investors would rely on his estimate of long-term 13 GDP growth as the appropriate growth rate for electric utility companies.

14 The second error is the magnitude of Mr. Cochran's long-term GDP growth rate 15 estimate of 5.40%. On page 1 of Attachment JRW-12 of my testimony, I provide an 16 analysis of GDP growth since 1960. Since 1960, nominal GDP has grown at a 17 compounded rate of 6.46%. Whereas GDP has grown at a compounded rate of 18 6.46% since 1960, economic growth in the U.S. has slowed considerably in recent 19 decades. Page 2 of Attachment JRW-12 provides the nominal annual GDP growth 20 rates over the 1961 to 2018 time period. Nominal GDP growth grew from 6.0% 21 to over 12% from the 1960s to the early 1980s due in large part to inflation and

1	higher prices. Despite an uptick during the mid-2000s, annual nominal GDP
2	growth rates have declined to the 2.0% to 4.0% range over the past decade. ⁴⁵
3	The components of nominal GDP growth are real GDP growth and inflation.
4	Page 3 of Attachment JRW-12 shows annual real GDP growth rate over the 1961
5	to 2018 time period. Real GDP growth has gradually declined from the 5.0% to
6	6.0% range in the 1960s to the 2.0% to 3.0% during the most recent five-year
7	period. The second component of nominal GDP growth is inflation. Page 4 of
8	Attachment JRW-12 shows inflation as measured by the annual growth rate in the
9	Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the 1960 to 2018 time period. The large increase
10	in prices from the late 1960s to the early 1980s is readily evident. Equally evident
11	is the rapid decline in inflation during the 1980s as inflation declined from above
12	10% to about 4%. Since that time inflation has gradually declined and has been in
13	the 2.0% range or below over the past five years.
14	The graphs on pages 2, 3, and 4 of Attachment JRW-12 provide very clear
15	evidence of the decline in nominal GDP as well as its components, real GDP and
16	inflation, in recent decades. To gauge the magnitude of the decline in nominal
17	GDP growth, Table 5 and page 5 of Attachment JRW-12 provide the compounded
18	GDP growth rates for 10-, 20-, 30-, 40- and 50- years. Whereas the 50-year
19	compounded GDP growth rate is 6.36%, there has been a monotonic and significant
20	decline in nominal GDP growth over subsequent 10-year intervals, especially in the

most recent 10-year interval. These figures clearly suggest that nominal GDP growth

⁴⁵ Nominal GDP did increase to 5.0% in 2018. However, this is a one-time boost associated with the 2017 decrease in income taxes.

1 in recent decades has slowed and that a growth rate in the range of 3.50% to 4.5% is

2 more appropriate today for the U.S. economy. Mr. Cochran's long-term GDP growth

- 3 rate of 5.40% is clearly inflated.
- 4

5

Table 5 Historic GDP Grov	vth Rates
10-Year Average	3.37%
20-Year Average	4.17%
30-Year Average	4.65%
40-Year Average	5.56%
50-Year Average	6.36%

6 7

8 Q. Are the lower GDP growth rates of recent decades consistent with the 9 forecasts of GDP growth?

10	A. A lower range is also consistent with long-term GDP forecasts. There are several
11	forecasts of annual GDP growth that are available from economists and
12	government agencies. These are listed in Panel B of on page 5 of Attachment
13	JRW-12. The mean 10-year nominal GDP growth forecast (as of March 2019) by
14	economists in the recent Survey of Financial Forecasters is 4.25%. ⁴⁶ The Energy
15	Information Administration ("EIA"), in its projections used in preparing Annual
16	Energy Outlook, forecasts long-term GDP growth of 4.20% for the period 2018-
17	2050. ⁴⁷ The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"), in its forecasts for the period
18	2019 to 2049, projects a nominal GDP growth rate of 4.40%. ⁴⁸ Finally, the Social

⁴⁶ https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professionalforecasters/

⁴⁷ U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Annual Energy Outlook 2019*, Table: Macroeconomic Indicators, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/appa.pdf.

⁴⁸ Congressional Budget Office, The 2019 Long-Term Budget Outlook, June 15, 2019 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/appa.pdf.

1	Security Administration ("SSA"), in its Annual OASDI Report, provides a	l
2	projection of nominal GDP from 2018-2095.49 SSA's projected growth GDP)
3	growth rate over this period is 4.35%. Overall, these forecasts suggest long-term	l
4	GDP growth rate in the 4.0% - 4.4% range. The trends and projections indicating	ŗ
5	slower GDP growth indicate that Mr. Cochran's GDP growth rate of 5.40% is	;
6	inflated.	
7	Q. Does Mr. Cochran provide any reasons why he has ignored the well-known	l
8	long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA?	
9	A. No.	
10		
10	Q. In your opinion, what is wrong with Mr. Cochran's real GDP forecast on	L
10	Q. In your opinion, what is wrong with Mr. Cochran's real GDP forecast on historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the	
11	historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the	è
11 12	historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA?	e 1
11 12 13	historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA?A. In developing a DCF growth rate for his constant-growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochran	e
11 12 13 14	 historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA? A. In developing a DCF growth rate for his constant-growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochran has totally ignored <u>historic</u> EPS, DPS, and BVPS data and relied solely on the long- 	e 1
11 12 13 14 15	 historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA? A. In developing a DCF growth rate for his constant-growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochran has totally ignored <u>historic EPS</u>, DPS, and BVPS data and relied solely on the long-term EPS growth rate <u>projections</u> of Wall Street analysts and <i>Value Line</i>. However, 	b
11 12 13 14 15 16	 historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA? A. In developing a DCF growth rate for his constant-growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochran has totally ignored <u>historic EPS</u>, DPS, and BVPS data and relied solely on the long-term EPS growth rate <u>projections</u> of Wall Street analysts and <i>Value Line</i>. However, in developing a terminal DCF growth rate for his multi-stage growth DCF analysis, 	
11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA? A. In developing a DCF growth rate for his constant-growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochram has totally ignored <u>historic EPS</u>, DPS, and BVPS data and relied solely on the long-term EPS growth rate <u>projections</u> of Wall Street analysts and <i>Value Line</i>. However, in developing a terminal DCF growth rate for his multi-stage growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochran has also totally ignored the well-known long-term real GDP growth rate 	

⁴⁹ Social Security Administration, 2019 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program, Table VI.G4, p. 211 (June 15, 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2019/VI_G2_OASDHI_GDP.html#200732. The 4.35% represents the compounded growth rate in projected GDP from \$21,485 trillion in 2019 to \$546,311 trillion in 2095.

4. <u>Mr. Cochrane's Claim that the DCF Model Understates the Cost of Equity</u> Capital

3

4 Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochran's claim that the DCF model understates the cost 5 of equity capital.

A. On page 22 of his testimony, Mr. Cochran makes the claim that using current
utility stock valuations and low dividend yields will underestimate the marketdetermined ROE. As a result, he says that he considered the results: (1) from the
high-end of his range of his DCF results; and (2) his CAPM approach.

10

Q. What is your response to this claim?

11 A. Mr. Cochran's claim is totally without merit for the following reasons: (1) he is 12 saying that utility stocks are overvalued and their stock prices will decline in the 13 future (and therefore their dividend yield will increase). Hence, Mr. Cochran 14 presumes that he knows more than investors in the stock market. Actually, if he 15 believes that utility sock prices will decline in the future, he should be forecasting 16 negative returns!; (2) his high-end results are the sum of the dividend yield and 17 only the highest projected growth rate for each proxy utility. Therefore, this 18 approach is reliant on one analyst and is not a consensus forecast of growth; (3) 19 the DCF approach directly measures the cost of equity capital because it uses 20 dividends, stock prices, and expected growth rates. The CAPM is an indirect 21 method of measuring the cost of equity capital with the only company-specific 22 input being beta. In addition, it is highly dependent on the market risk premium 23 which, as discussed above, is one of the great mysteries in finance; and (4) as

1	discussed below, Mr. Cochran's CAPM result is grossly inflated due to its totally
2	unrealistic assumptions on future earnings and economic growth and future stock
3	returns.
4	
5	B. CAPM Approach
6	
7	Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochran's CAPM.
8	A. On pages 22-6 of his testimony and in Attachments JC-6-JC-8, Mr. Cochran
9	estimates an equity cost rate by applying a CAPM model to his proxy group. The
10	CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free interest rate, beta, and the
11	equity risk premium. Mr. Cochran uses: (1) a current (30-day average) 30-Year
12	Treasury bond yield 3.03%; (2) an average Value Line Beta of 0.57; and (3)a
13	market risk premium of 13.49%. Based on these figures, he finds a CAPM equity
14	cost rate of 13.49%. Mr. Cochran's CAPM results are summarized on page 1 of
15	Attachment JRW-10.
16	Q. What are the errors in Mr. Cochran's CAPM analysis?
17	A. The two issues are: (1) the current 30-Year Treasury yield of 3.03%; and (2) Mr.
18	Cochran's CAPM analysis are the expected market risk premium of 13.49%.
19	
20	
21	
22	1. Current Risk-Free Interest Rate
23	

1	Q. What is the issue with the current long-term Treasury rate of 3.03%	?	
2	A. Mr. Cochran's current 30-year Treasury yield is stale. As previously	discussed,	
3	interest rates have declined significantly in 2019 and the Federal Reserve	has cut the	
4	federal funds rate on three occasions. The 3.03% current 30-year Treasure	ury yield is	
5	more than 75 basis points above current 30-year Treasury yield of about 2.25%.		
6			
7	2. Market Risk Premium		
8			
9	Q. What are the errors in Mr. Cochran's CAPM analyses?		
10	A. The primary error in Mr. Cochran's CAPM analysis is the market p	remium of	
11	13.49%.		
12	Q. Please assess Mr. Cochran's market risk premium derived from ap	plying the	
13	DCF model to the S&P 500 using Value Line EPS growth rates.		
14	A. Mr. Cochran computes a market risk premium of 13.49% by: (1) cald	culating an	
15	expected stock market return by applying the DCF model to the S&F	• 500; and,	
16	then (2) subtracting the current 30-year Treasury bond yield. Mr.	Cochran's	
17	estimated expected market return is 16.53% (using Value Line EPS g	rowth rate	
18	estimates). Mr. Cochran also uses (1) a dividend yield of 2.17% and a	n expected	
19	DCF growth rate of 14.35%. The market risk premium is then compu	uted as the	
20	expected stock market return minus the risk-free interest rate (16.5	3%-3.03%	
21	=13.49%).		

22 Q. How did Mr. Cochran err when analyzing market premium?

A. The error is that Mr. Cochran computed the expected market return using the DCF
model with the growth rate being the projected 5-year EPS growth rate from *Value Line*. Simply stated, the expected EPS growth rates and the associated expected
stock market return and resulting market risk premium are totally unrealistic and
defy economic logic.

Q. Is Mr. Cochran's market risk premium of 13.49% reflective of the market risk premiums found in published studies and surveys?

8 A. No. It is well in excess of the market risk premiums: (1) found in studies of the 9 market risk premiums by leading academic scholars; (2) produced by analyses of 10 historic stock and bond returns; and (3) found in surveys of financial professionals. Page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provides the results of over thirty market risk 11 12 premiums studies from the past fifteen years. Historic stock and bond returns 13 suggest a market risk premium in the 4.5% to 7.0% range, depending on whether 14 one uses arithmetic or geometric mean returns. There have been many studies 15 using expected return (also called *ex ante*) models, and their market risk premiums 16 results vary from as low as 2.0% to as high as 7.31%. Finally, the market risk 17 premiums developed from surveys of analysts, companies, financial professionals, 18 and academics suggest lower market risk premiums, in a range of from 1.85% to 19 5.70%. The bottom line is that there is no support in historic return data, surveys, 20 academic studies, or reports for investment firms for a market risk premium as 21 high as those used by Mr. Cochran.

Q. Please once again address the issues with analysts' as well as *Value Line*'s EPS growth rate forecasts.

A. The key point is that Mr. Cochran's CAPM market risk premium methodology is
based entirely on the concept that *Value Line*'s projections of companies' EPS
growth rates reflect investors' expected *long-term* EPS growth for those
companies. However, this seems highly unrealistic given the research on these
projections. As noted above, the EPS growth rate forecasts of *Value Line*, such as
those used by Mr. Cochran, have been to be significantly higher than the EPS
growth rates that these companies subsequently achieve.⁵⁰

Q. Is there other evidence that indicates that Mr. Cochran's market risk premium developed using *Value Line*'s EPS growth rates is excessive?

A. Yes. The fact is that a long-term EPS growth rate of 14.35% is inconsistent with
both historic and projected economic and earnings growth in the U.S for several
reasons: (1) long-term EPS and economic growth is about one-half of Mr.
Cochran's projected EPS growth rate of 14.35%; (2) as discussed below, longterm EPS and GDP growth are directly linked; and (3) more recent trends in GDP
growth, as well as projections of GDP growth, suggest slower economic and
earnings growth in the future.

19

Long-Term Historic EPS and GDP Growth have been in the 6%-7% Range -

- 20
- In Attachment JRW-12, I performed a study of the growth in nominal GDP, S&P

⁵⁰ Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C. (2008). "An Examination of Value Line's Long-Term Projections," *Journal of Banking & Finance*, May 2008, pp. 820-833.

1 500 stock price appreciation, and S&P 500 EPS and DPS growth since 1960. The

2 results are provided on page 1 of Attachment JRW-10, and a summary is shown

3 in Table 6, below.

Table 6
GDP, S&P 500 Stock Price, EPS, and DPS Growth
1960-Present

Nominal GDP	6.46
S&P 500 Stock Price	6.71
S&P 500 EPS	6.89
<u>S&P 500 DPS</u>	<u>5.85</u>
Average	6.48

7

4

5 6

8 The results show that the historical long-run growth rates for GDP, S&P EPS, 9 and S&P DPS are in the 6% to 7% range. By comparison, Mr. Cochran's long-10 run growth rate projection of 14.35% is at best overstated. This estimate suggests 11 that companies in the U.S. would be expected to: (1) increase their growth rate of 12 EPS by 100% in the future, and (2) maintain that growth indefinitely in an 13 economy that is expected to grow at about one-third of his projected growth rates. 14 There is a Direct Link Between Long-Term EPS and GDP Growth - The results 15 in Attachment JRW-12 and Table 6 show that historically there has been a close 16 link between long-term EPS and GDP growth rates. Brad Cornell of the California 17 Institute of Technology published a study on GDP growth, earnings growth, and 18 equity returns. He finds that long-term EPS growth in the U.S. is directly related 19 to GDP growth, with GDP growth providing an upward limit on EPS growth. In

1	addition, he finds that long-term stock returns are determined by long-term	
2	earnings growth. He concludes with the following observations: ⁵¹	
3	The long-run performance of equity investments is fundamentally	
4	linked to growth in earnings. Earnings growth, in turn, depends on	
5	growth in real GDP. This article demonstrates that both theoretical	
6	research and empirical research in development economics suggest	
7	relatively strict limits on future growth. In particular, real GDP	
8	growth in excess of 3 percent in the long run is highly unlikely in	
9	the developed world. In light of ongoing dilution in earnings per	
10	share, this finding implies that investors should anticipate real	
11	returns on U.S. common stocks to average no more than about 4–5	
12	percent in real terms.	
13	The Trend and Projections Indicate Slower GDP Growth in the Future - The	
14	components of nominal GDP growth are real GDP growth and inflation. As	
15	discussed above and shown on pages 2-5 of Attachment JRW-12, real GDP growth	
16	has gradually declined from the 5.0% to 6.0% range in the 1960s to the 2.0% to	
17	3.0% range during the recent years. In addition, inflation as measured by the	
18	annual growth rate in the CPI has declined and has been in the 2.0% range or below	
19	over the past five years. This decline in nominal GDP growth was shown in Table	
20	5 and suggest that a figure in the range of 4.0% to 5.0% is more appropriate today	
21	for the U.S. economy.	
22	Long-Term GDP Projections also Indicate Slower GDP Growth in the Future	
23	Likewise, as discussed above, projections of nominal GDP by various government	
24	and industry agencies in including the EIA, CBO, and suggest long-term GDP	
25	growth rate in the 4.0% - 4.4% range. Given this range, Mr. Cochran's market	

⁵¹ Bradford Cornell, "Economic Growth and Equity Investing," *Financial Analysts Journal* (January-February 2010), p. 63.

1	risk premium presumes a projected EPS growth rate of 14.35% that is almost three
2	times projected GDP growth. Given the connection between EPS and GDP growth
3	rates, this defies economic logic.
4	Q. What fundamental factors have led to the decline in prospective GDP
5	growth?
6	A. As addressed in a study by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co., two factors drive
7	real GDP growth over time: (a) the number of workers in the economy
8	(employment); and (2) the productivity of those workers (usually defined as output
9	per hour). ⁵² According to McKinsey, real GDP growth over the past 50 years was
10	driven by population and productivity growth which grew at compound annual
11	rates of 1.7% and 1.8%, respectively.
12	However, global economic growth is projected to slow significantly in the
13	years to come. The primary factor leading to the decline is slow growth in
14	employment (working-age population), which results from slower population
15	growth and longer life expectancy. McKinsey estimates that employment growth
16	will slow to 0.3% over the next fifty years. They conclude that even if productivity
17	remains at the rapid rate of the past fifty years of 1.8%, real GDP growth will fall
18	by 40 percent to 2.1%.

⁵² McKinsey & Co., "Can Long-Term Growth be Saved?", McKinsey Global Institute, (Jan. 2015).

1 Q. Please provide more insights into the relationship between S&P 500 EPS and

2 **GDP growth.**

A. Figure 8 shows the average annual growth rates for GDP and the S&P 500 EPS
since 1960. The one very apparent difference between the two is that the S&P 500
EPS growth rates are much more volatile than the GDP growth rates, when
compared using the relatively short, and somewhat arbitrary, annual conventions
used in these data.⁵³ Volatility aside, however, it is clear that over the medium to
long run, S&P 500 EPS growth does not outpace GDP growth.

Figure 8


Average Annual Growth Rates

9

10



12



13

⁵³ Timing conventions such as years and quarters are needed for measurement and benchmarking but are somewhat arbitrary. In reality, economic growth and profit accrual occur on continuous bases. A 2014 study evaluated the timing relationship between corporate profits and nominal GDP growth. The authors found that aggregate accounting earnings growth is a leading indicator of the GDP growth with a quarter-ahead forecast horizon. *See* Yaniv Konchitchki and Panos N. Patatoukas, "Accounting Earnings and Gross Domestic Product," *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 57 (2014), pp. 76–88. 1 Data Sources: GDPA - http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPA/downloaddata.

- 2 S&P EPS - http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
- 3 A fuller understanding of the relationship between GDP and S&P 500 EPS 4 growth requires consideration of several other factors. 5 Corporate Profits are Constrained by GDP - Milton Friedman, the noted 6 economist, warned investors and others not to expect corporate profit growth to 7 sustainably exceed GDP growth, stating, "Beware of predictions that earnings can 8 grow faster than the economy for long periods. When earnings are exceptionally 9 high, they don't just keep booming."⁵⁴ Friedman also noted in the Fortune 10 interview that profits must move back down to their traditional share of GDP. In 11 Table 7, below, I show that currently the aggregate net income levels for the S&P 12 500 companies, using 2018 figures, represent 6.73% of nominal GDP. 13 Table 7 14

S&P 500 Aggregate Net Income as a Percent of GDP

	Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500 Companies (\$B)	\$1,406,400.00
	2018 Nominal U.S. GDP (\$B)	\$20,891,000.00
	Net Income/GDP (%)	6.73%
15 16 17	Data Sources: 2018 Net Income for S&P 500 companies – Value Line (2018 Nominal GDP – Moody's - https://www.economy.com/united-stat domestic-product.	
18	Short-Term Factors Impact S&P 500 EPS – The growth	rates in the S&P 500
19	EPS and GDP can diverge on a year-to-year basis due to s	short-term factors that
20	impact S&P 500 EPS in a much greater way than GDP. A	As shown above, S&P
21	EPS growth rates are much more volatile than GDP growth r	ates. The EPS growth
22	for the S&P 500 companies has been influenced by low la	bor costs and interest

54 Shaun Tully, "Corporate Profits Are Soaring. Here's Why It Can't Last," Fortune, (Dec. 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/corporate-earnings-profit-boom-end/.

rates, commodity prices, the recovery of different sectors such as the energy and
financial sectors, the cut in corporate tax rates, etc. These short-term factors can
make it appear that there is a disconnect between the economy and corporate
profits.

5 The Differences Between the S&P 500 EPS and GDP – In the last three years, 6 as the EPS for the S&P 500 has grown at a faster rate than U.S. nominal GDP, 7 some have pointed to the differences between the S&P 500 and GDP.⁵⁵ These 8 differences include: (a) corporate profits are about 2/3 manufacturing driven, while 9 GDP is 2/3 services driven; (b) consumer discretionary spending accounts for a 10 smaller share of S&P 500 profits (15%) than of GDP (23%); (c) corporate profits 11 are more international-trade driven, while exports minus imports tend to drag on 12 GDP; and (d) S&P 500 EPS is impacted not just by corporate profits but also by 13 share buybacks on the positive side (fewer shares boost EPS) and by share dilution 14 on the negative side (new shares dilute EPS). While these differences may seem 15 significant, it must be remembered that the Income Approach to measure GDP 16 includes corporate profits (in addition to employee compensation and taxes on 17 production and imports) and therefore effectively accounts for the first three factors.56 18

⁵⁵ See the following studies: Burt White and Jeff Buchbinder, "The S&P and GDP are not the Same Thing," LPL Financial, (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/sp-is-not-gdp-2014-11; Matt Comer, "How Do We Have 18.4% Earnings Growth In A 2.58% GDP Economy?," Seeking Alpha, (Apr. 2018), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4164052-18_4-percent-earnings-growth-2_58-percent-gdp-economy; Shaun Tully, "How on Earth Can Profits Grow at 10% in a 2% Economy?," Fortune, (July 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/27/profits-economic-growth/.

⁵⁶ The Income Approach to measuring GDP includes wages, salaries, and supplementary labor income, corporate profits, interest and miscellaneous investment income, farmers' incomes, and income from non-farm unincorporated businesses

Q. Please provide addition evidence showing that Mr. Cochran's S&P 500 EPS

4 5

growth rate of 14.35% is not realistic.

6 **A.** Beyond my previous discussion, I have also performed the following analysis of 7 S&P 500 EPS and GDP growth in Table 8 below. Specifically, I started with the 8 2018 aggregate net income for the S&P 500 companies and 2018 nominal GDP 9 for the U.S. As shown in Table 7, the aggregate profit for the S&P 500 companies 10 represented 6.73% of nominal GDP in 2018. In Table 8, I then project the 11 aggregate net income level for the S&P 500 companies and GDP as of the year 12 2050. For the growth rate for the S&P 500 companies, I used Mr. Cochran's Value 13 *Line* projected EPS growth rate of 14.73%. As a growth rate for nominal GDP, I 14 used the average of the long-term projected GDP growth rates from CBO, SSA, 15 and EIA (4.0%, 4.4%, and 4.3%), which is 4.23%. The projected 2050 level for 16 the aggregate net income level for the S&P 500 companies is \$102.7 trillion. However, over the same period GDP only grows to \$78.7 trillion. As such, if the 17 18 aggregate net income for the S&P 500 grows in accordance with the growth rates 19 used by Mr. Cochran, and if nominal GDP grows at rates projected by major 20 government agencies, the net income of the S&P 500 companies will represent 1 growth from 6.73% of GDP in 2018 to 130.59% of GDP in 2050. Obviously, it is

2

implausible for the net income of the S&P 500 to become larger than GDP!

3

Table 8 Projected S&P 500 Earnings and Nominal GDP 2018-2050				
S&P 500 Aggregate Net Income as a Percent of GDP 2018 Growth No. of 2050				
	Value	Rate	Years	Value
Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500	1,406,400.0	14.35%	32	102,722,661.7
2018 Nominal U.S. GDP	20,891,000.0	4.23%	32	78,735,624.7
Net Income/GDP (%)	6.73%			130.47%

 8
 Income/GDP (%)
 6.73%
 130.47%

 9
 Data Sources: 2018 Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500 companies – Value Line (March 12, 2019).

 10
 2018 Nominal GDP – Moody's - https://www.economy.com/united-states/nominal-gross-domestic

2018 Nominal GDP – Moody's - https://www.economy.com/united-states/nominal-gross-domestic product.

12 S&P 500 EPS Growth Rate – Mr. Cochran's Value Line projected EPS growth rate - 14.35%;

Nominal GDP Growth Rate – The average of the long-term projected GDP growth rates from CBO,
 SSA, and EIA (4.0%, 4.4%, and 4.3%).

15

16 Q. Please provide a summary assessment of GDP and S&P 500 EPS growth

17 **rates.**

A. As noted above, the long-term link between corporate profits and GDP is
inevitable. The short-term differences in growth between the two has been
highlighted by some notable market observers, including Warren Buffet, who
indicated that corporate profits as a share of GDP tend to go far higher after periods
where they are depressed, and then drop sharply after they have been hovering at
historically high levels. In a famous 1999 *Fortune* article, Mr. Buffet made the
following observation:⁵⁷
You know, someone once told me that New York has more lawyers

You know, someone once told me that New York has more lawyersthan people. I think that's the same fellow who thinks profits will

⁵⁷ Carol Loomis, "Mr. Buffet on the Stock Market," *Fortune*, (Nov. 22, 1999), https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1999/11/22/269071/.

1 become larger than GDP. When you begin to expect the growth of a 2 component factor to forever outpace that of the aggregate, you get into 3 certain mathematical problems. In my opinion, you have to be wildly 4 optimistic to believe that corporate profits as a percent of GDP can, 5 for any sustained period, hold much above 6%. One thing keeping the percentage down will be competition, which is alive and well. In 6 7 addition, there's a public-policy point: If corporate investors, in aggregate, are going to eat an ever-growing portion of the American 8 9 economic pie, some other group will have to settle for a smaller 10 portion. That would justifiably raise political problems – and in my 11 view a major reslicing of the pie just isn't going to happen.

12 In sum, Mr. Cochran's long-term S&P 500 EPS growth rate of 14.35% is 13 grossly overstated and has no basis in economic reality. In the end, the big 14 question remains as to whether corporate profits can grow faster than GDP. Jeremy Siegel, the renowned finance professor at the Wharton School of the 15 16 University of Pennsylvania, believes that going forward, earnings per share can 17 grow about half a point faster than nominal GDP, or about 5.0%, due to the big 18 gains in the technology sector. But he also believes that sustained EPS growth 19 matching analysts' near-term projections is absurd: "The idea of 8% or 10% or 12% growth is ridiculous. It will not happen."⁵⁸ 20

21 Q. Finally, please provide an overall evaluation of Mr. Cochran's expected stock

22 market return that is used to develop his market risk premium.

A. The are several additional issues with the *Value Line* results. Simply put, the 16.53% expected stock market return is outrageous. The compounded annual return in the U.S. stock market is about 10% (9.49% according to Damodaran

⁵⁸ Shaun Tully, "Corporate Profits Are Soaring. Here's Why It Can't Last," *Fortune*, (Dec. 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/corporate-earnings-profit-boom-end/.

1	between 1928-2018). ⁵⁹ Mr. Cochran's Value Line CAPM results assume that
2	return on the U.S. stock market will be more than 100% higher in the future than
3	it has been in the past! The extremely high expected stock market return, and the
4	resulting market risk premium and equity cost rate results, is directly related to the
5	14.35% expected EPS growth rate. There are numerous fallacies with this growth
6	rate. First, the expected growth rate is not from today going forward, but instead
7	it is computed from a three-year base period in the past (2015-2017) to a projected
8	three-year period in the future (2021-2023). The problem here is that it
9	incorporates historic growth in the base period, which can inflate projected growth
10	for the future if the base period includes poor earnings. Second, and most
11	significantly, a projected growth rate of 14.35% does not reflect economic reality.
12	As noted above, it assumes that S&P 500 companies can grow their earnings in
13	the future at a rate that is triple the expected GDP growth rate.
14	
15	D. Flotation Cost and Size Adjustments
16	
17	Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochran's consideration of flotation costs.
18	A. Mr. Cochran claims than a flotation cost adjustment of 0.10% is justified to
19	account for flotation costs. However, this is unnecessary for two reasons. First,
20	as indicated in response to Staff 8-10, there have been no equity infusions into
21	Granite State in the past five years. Second, as stated in response to Staff 8-21,

⁵⁹ http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

Granite State has not paid any flotation costs in the past five years. He has not
 identified any equity issuances/infusions or flotation costs for Granite State.
 Therefore, he is claiming that the Company deserves additional revenues in the
 form of a high ROE to account for flotation costs that have not been identified or
 paid.

Beyond this issue, it is commonly argued that a flotation cost adjustment (such
as that used by the Company) is necessary to prevent the stock price dilution of
the existing shareholders. However, this is incorrect for several reasons:

9 (1)If an equity flotation cost adjustment is similar to a debt flotation cost 10 adjustment, the fact that the market-to-book ratios for electric utility companies 11 are over 1.5X actually suggests that there should be a flotation cost *reduction* (and 12 not an increase) to the equity cost rate. This is because when (a) a bond is issued 13 at a price in excess of face or book value, and (b) the difference between its market 14 price and the book value is greater than the flotation or issuance costs, the cost of 15 that debt is lower than the coupon rate of the debt. The amount by which market 16 values of electric utility companies are in excess of book values is much greater 17 than flotation costs. Hence, if common stock flotation costs were exactly like bond 18 flotation costs, and one was making an explicit flotation cost adjustment to the cost 19 of common equity, the adjustment would be downward;

20 (2) If a flotation cost adjustment is needed to prevent dilution of existing 21 stockholders' investment, then the reduction of the book value of stockholder 22 investment associated with flotation costs can occur only when a company's stock 23 is selling at a market price at or below its book value. As noted above, electric 2

3

1

utility companies are selling at market prices well in excess of book value. Hence, when new shares are sold, existing shareholders realize an increase in the book value per share of their investment, not a decrease;

4 (3) Flotation costs consist primarily of the underwriting spread (or fee) 5 rather than out-of-pocket expenses. On a per-share basis, the underwriting spread 6 is the difference between the price the investment banker receives from investors 7 and the price the investment banker pays to the company. These are not expenses 8 that should be recovered through the regulatory process. Furthermore, the 9 underwriting spread is known to the investors who are buying the new issue of 10 stock, and who are well aware of the difference between the price they are paying 11 to buy the stock and the price that the company is receiving. The offering price 12 which they pay is what matters when investors decide to buy a stock based on its 13 expected return and risk prospects. Therefore, the Company is not entitled to an 14 adjustment to the allowed return to account for those costs; and

15 (4) Flotation costs, in the form of the underwriting spread, are a form of a 16 transaction cost in the market. They represent the difference between the price 17 paid by investors and the amount received by the issuing company. Whereas 18 Granite State believes that it should be compensated for these transaction costs, it 19 has not accounted for *other* market transaction costs in determining its cost of 20 equity. Most notably, brokerage fees that investors pay when they buy shares in 21 the open market are another market transaction cost. Brokerage fees increase the 22 effective stock price paid by investors to buy shares. If the Company had included 23 these brokerage fees or transaction costs in its DCF analysis, the higher effective

1	stock prices paid for stocks would lead to lower dividend yields and equity cost
2	rates. This would result in a downward adjustment to their DCF equity cost rate.
3	Finally, I would point out that the New Hampshire PUC has found that, lacking
4	any evidence of actual or planned issuances, such costs should not be
5	compensated." See Re: Pennichuck Water Works, Inc. 70 NH PUC 850, 863
6	(1985, 70 NH PUC 862).
7	Q. What other adjustments does Mr. Cochran propose?
8	A. In his assessment of the Company's business risk, Mr. Cochran claims that Granite
9	State deserves a small size premium.
10	Q. Do you agree with Mr. Cochran's claim that the company deserves a small
11	size premium?
12	A. No. The inclusion of a size premium is erroneous for two reasons.
13	First, I have used the credit ratings of Granite State and the companies in the
14	proxy group for risk comparison purposes. In their assessment of business risk,
15	credit rating agencies include various factors including the size and geographic
16	service territory of a utility. Therefore, there is no reason to make a separate
17	adjustment for size.
18	Second, Mr. Cochran justifies his size adjustment based on the historical stock
19	market returns studies as performed by Morningstar (formerly Ibbotson
20	Associates). There are numerous errors in using historical market returns to
21	compute risk premiums. ⁶⁰ These errors provide inflated estimates of expected

⁶⁰ These issues are addressed in a number of studies, including: Aswath. Damodaran, "Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications – The 2015 Edition" NYU Working Paper, 2015, pp. 32-5; See Richard Roll, "On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm risk premiums. Among the errors are survivorship bias (only successful
companies survive – poor companies do not) and unattainable return bias (the
Ibbotson procedure presumes monthly portfolio rebalancing). The net result is that
Ibbotson's size premiums are poor measures for risk adjustment to account for the
size of a utility.

6 In addition, Professor Annie Wong has tested for a size premium in utilities 7 and concluded that, unlike industrial stocks, utility stocks do not exhibit a significant size premium.⁶¹ As explained by Professor Wong, there are several 8 9 reasons why such a size premium would not be attributable to utilities. Utilities are 10 regulated closely by state and federal agencies and commissions, and hence, their 11 financial performance is monitored on an ongoing basis by both the state and federal 12 governments. In addition, public utilities must gain approval from government 13 entities for common financial transactions such as the sale of securities. Furthermore, 14 unlike their industrial counterparts, accounting standards and reporting are fairly 15 standardized for public utilities. Finally, a utility's earnings are predetermined to a 16 certain degree through the ratemaking process in which performance is reviewed by 17 state commissions and other interested parties. Overall, in terms of regulation, 18 government oversight, performance review, accounting standards, and information 19 disclosure, utilities are much different than industrials, which could account for the

Premium," *Journal of Financial Economics*, pp. 371-86, (1983); Jay Ritter, "The Biggest Mistakes We Teach," *Journal of Financial Research* (Summer 2002); Bradford Cornell, *The Equity Risk Premium* (New York, John Wiley & Sons),1999, pp. 36-78; J. P. Morgan, "The Most Important Number in Finance," p. 6., Duff & Phelps, Client Alert, March 16, 2016, p. 35.

⁶¹ Annie Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of the Midwest Finance Association*, pp. 95-101, (1993).

1 lack of a size premium.

2 Q. Please discuss the research on the size premium in estimating the equity cost

3 rate.

A. As noted, there are errors in using historical market returns to compute risk
premiums. With respect to the small firm premium, Richard Roll (1983) found that
one-half of the historic return premium for small companies disappears once biases
are eliminated and historic returns are properly computed. The error arises from
the assumption of monthly portfolio rebalancing and the serial correlation in
historic small firm returns.⁶²

10 In another paper, Ching-Chih Lu (2009) estimated the size premium over the 11 long-run. Lu acknowledges that many studies have demonstrated that smaller 12 companies have historically earned higher stock market returns. However, Lu 13 highlights that these studies rebalance the size portfolios on an annual basis. This 14 means that at the end of each year the stocks are sorted based on size, split into 15 deciles, and the returns are computed over the next year for each stock decile. This 16 annual rebalancing creates the problem. Using a size premium in estimating a 17 CAPM equity cost rate requires that a firm carry the extra size premium in its 18 discount factor for an extended period of time, not just for one year, which is the 19 presumption with annual rebalancing. Through an analysis of small firm stock 20 returns for longer time periods (and without annual rebalancing), Lu finds that the 21 size premium disappears within two years. Lu's conclusion with respect to the

⁶² See Richard Roll, "On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium," Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 371-86, (1983).

1	size premium is that "a small firm should not be expected to have a higher size
2	premium going forward sheerly because it is small now": ⁶³
3	However, an analysis of the evolution of the size premium will
4	show that it is inappropriate to attach a fixed amount of premium
5	to the cost of equity of a firm simply because of its current market
6	capitalization. For a small stock portfolio which does not
7	rebalance since the day it was constructed, its annual return and
8	the size premium are all declining over years instead of staying at
9	a relatively stable level. This confirms that a small firm should not
10	be expected to have a higher size premium going forward sheerly
11	because it is small now.
12	
13	Finally, in a more recent paper, Ang (2017) tested for a size effect over the
14	time period 1981-2016. ⁶⁴ He used value-weighted size-based decile returns
15	obtained from French's Data Library, with the smallest size-based decile as a
16	proxy for small stocks and the largest size-based decile as a proxy for large stocks.
17	He found that small stocks underperformed large stocks by 12% over the period
18	1981 to 2016. He claims that this result is consistent with other studies that the
19	size effect vanished in the 1980s. He concluded with the following: ⁶⁵
20	
20 21	My review of the evidence and analysis strongly suggests the
22	proponents of the size effect are nowhere close to meeting their
23	burden. I find that investors use the CAPM and do not demand
24	compensation for size when setting their required rate of return,
25	which directly contradicts the need to augment or modify the CAPM
26	Cost of Equity with a size premium. I show that small stocks do not
27	outperform large stocks, which calls into question the very premise
28	of a size effect. I also find that studies finding a size effect suffer from
29	the twin fatal flaws of lacking a theoretical basis and data mining,
30	which are very difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. Given the

⁶³ Ching-Chih Lu, "The Size Premium in the Long Run," 2009 Working Paper, SSRN abstract no. 1368705.

⁶⁴ Clifford Ang, "The Absence of a Size Effect Relevant to the Cost of Equity," June 9, 2017, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984599.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

above, practitioners should abandon the practice of augmenting or
 modifying the CAPM Cost of Equity with a size premium.

4 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

- 5 A. Yes, it does.
- 6

Liberty Utilities (Granite State Electric) Corp. Docket No. DE 19-064

Direct Testimony of Dr. J. Randall Woolridge

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachment	Title
JRW-1	Qualifications of J. Randall Woolridge
JRW-2	Credit Reports
JRW-3	Recommended Cost of Capital
JRW-4	Summary Financial Statistics for Proxy Group
JRW-5	Capital Structure and Debt Cost Rate
JRW-6	The Relationship Between Estimated ROE and Market-to-Book Ratios
JRW-7	Utility Capital Cost Indicators
JRW-8	DCF Model
JRW-9	DCF Study
JRW-10	CAPM Study
JRW-11	Granite State's Rate of Return Recommendation
JRW-12	GDP and S&P 500 Growth Rates